From the issue dated November 8, 2002
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The Israeli-Palestinian ConflictThe implications of a war in Iraq for the Arab-Israeli conflict will depend in
A lightning-fast American victory followed by the establishment of a representative Iraqi government and energetic, Western-aided national reconstruction would probably enhance the momentum behind conflict resolution elsewhere in the region. But a U.S. occupation of Iraq might heighten resentment of the superpower and of what most Arabs view as its regional proxy, Israel -- whose own military occupation is a source of great resentment. A long American occupation of Iraq could, thus, make it more difficult to secure Arab states' support for a deal that would inevitably include hard compromises on Jerusalem, refugees, and other issues close to the hearts of the Arab public. Moreover, while a successful military campaign might improve the environment for Israeli-Arab rapprochement, it might weaken actors who are key to achieving a settlement. Jordan's moderate monarchy could be deeply shaken by a war: Caught between Iraq and Israel, it is likely to be deluged by Iraqi refugees. Syria's teetering economy has been relying on illicit Iraqi trade for income, and on alliances with terrorist groups in its conflict with Israel; a successful anti-terror campaign in Iraq would turn up the heat on Damascus. The Palestinian leadership, having lost credibility with America, Israel, and ordinary Palestinians, would be pressured from all sides in an Iraq war; reinventing or replacing the Palestinian leadership might take longer than five years. And the Sharon government in Israel could be faced with terrible choices about whether and how to retaliate against Iraqi attacks. If Israelis suffer from Iraqi missiles or Iraqi-sponsored terrorism, they may be less willing to support a peace deal that leaves their security at least partly in the hands of their Arab neighbors. On the other hand, there is nothing like the horror of a regional war to remind both Israelis and Arabs how much they have to gain by making peace. And, just as in 1991, the United States is likely to feel pressed after a war in Iraq to reward Arab allies and prove its benign intentions for the region by promoting the peace process. When the peace process is moving well, America's reputation in the region improves. When the peace process stalls or when violence takes hold, as today, resentment of America grows. That may be the result of an unfair assumption about American omnipotence -- many locals believe that, if it really wanted to, America could impose peace -- but it is nonetheless an operative assumption in the region and one the United States must confront. The long-term interests of the United States demand a successful peace process; that is why, five years after a war with Iraq, its long-term and short-term interests are likely to align to push aggressively for a stable and equitable settlement to this century-old conflict. Tamara Wittes, director of programs at the Middle East Institute (Washington) http://chronicle.com Section: The Chronicle Review Volume 49, Issue 11, Page B11
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Copyright © 2002 by The Chronicle of Higher Education