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[seventhyear]

The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed charges yesterday against the University of California and UC Los Angeles professor Patrick Harran for felony violations of labor laws in the death of chemistry researcher Sheharbano (Sheri) Sangji.

Sangji died three years ago from injuries sustained in a laboratory fire.

http://cenblog.org/the-safety-zone/2011/12/uc-patrick-harran-face-criminal-charges-in-death-of-sheri-sangji/

For those who may not remember, this was the student who was fatally burned with t-butyl lithium.

Are any of you considering changes in your lab safety/training?

[notaprof]

I was just about to post the LA Times story that is linked in this article. 

I didn't know this young woman but I know people who knew her and her family. Such a tragedy and yet, despite that, a 40 year prison sentence seems very harsh.  To be honest, I don't know where I stand on this.  I know the family deserves answers. 

How long is a lab usually given to address identified safety issues?  How soon should UCLA have reacted? Changes to problems that had been identified seemed easy enough to have been addressed sooner.

[pathogen]

This is the stuff of my nightmares. Having a student injured in my lab is the worst thing I can imagine, even without criminal liability. I'm not an organic chemist. What were they doing wrong here that this happened?

[ideagirl]

I was just about to post the LA Times story that is linked in this article. 

I didn't know this young woman but I know people who knew her and her family. Such a tragedy and yet, despite that, a 40 year prison sentence seems very harsh. 

Where are you getting the 40-year figure? The LA Times article said 4 1/2 years:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/12/ucla-says-it-will-defend-outrageous-felony-charges-in-fatal-lab-fire.html

[marigolds]

A comment on a blog posting about this story (it may be the link posted in the OP) asserted that the whole "untrained" charge was bogus in an academic lab setting, since academic researchers expect their lab workers (professional or grad student) to remember their training once they've had it.  The comment essentially said that the OSHA was applying corporate/commercial lab rules and norms about training and expertise (basically, assume everyone is an idiot and train from the bottom up) in a situation where the fundamental assumption is that one is NOT an idiot.

What do those of you in the lab sciences think of that argument?

[jackit_n_tyy]

I worked in two labs that when serious accidents occurred -- one much worse than the other.  Neither involving me. 

My Dad escaped being killed in an industrial accident because they day the plant blew up he happened to take vacation.

The employee in question in this discussion was not a grad student or other trainee, but was staff member.  In this case, there is no doubt that there are standard safety obligations that employers are responsible for, and they are spelled out in OSHA regulations, and in other laws, I imagine.  Employees should not be put into a position where simple errors can lead to death. 

I've read some of the online discussion on this, but honestly, I have no idea what the actual truth is in this particular case.

But is it theoretically possible that high-minded academician can be rightfully charged with negligence?  You betcha.

[anon99]

Based on the link provided by the OP, it seems that her death, sadly, may have been preventable had she worn a flame-resistant lab coat.  It doesn't say if one was available.  I don't think people (staff or students) should have to be repeatedly trained if they are doing the same experiments frequently.  If they are doing potentially dangerous experiments and only do them once a year, then yes they should be supervised by someone who does them regularly.

Were the dangers pointed out to her, was information available to her.  The blog mentions lab coats not being worn regularly.  I don't know about this specific lab, but in my lab we don't wear lab coats all the time because there is no need (I am NOT a chemist).  Students do wear them when working with specific chemicals and they are there for them to wear all the time.

If Harran was truly negligent and did not provide proper training or safety equipment, then yes he should be charged along with the university.

According to an older article, she was transferring a highly flammable substance contained in another flammable substance while not wearing a lab coat, but instead a polyester sweater.  Once the syringe caught fire, she (understandably) panicked and didn't use the shower next to her to put out the fire.  Her death is sad, but what is sadder is it was totally preventable.

[notaprof]

I was just about to post the LA Times story that is linked in this article. 

I didn't know this young woman but I know people who knew her and her family. Such a tragedy and yet, despite that, a 40 year prison sentence seems very harsh. 

Where are you getting the 40-year figure? The LA Times article said 4 1/2 years:
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/12/ucla-says-it-will-defend-outrageous-felony-charges-in-fatal-lab-fire.html

How embarrassing, my brain apparently read the guy's age and the prison sentence together. If found guilty, a 4 1/2 year sentence doesn't seem inappropriate. 

My understanding that much of the fault may have to do with the fact that the lab was cited for some                 safety violations two months earlier which included citations for not wearing lab coats when appropriate and improper storage of flammable liquids and volatile chemicals.  Both of those things could have been corrected and would appear to be directly related to this accident.   

[polly_mer]

A comment on a blog posting about this story (it may be the link posted in the OP) asserted that the whole "untrained" charge was bogus in an academic lab setting, since academic researchers expect their lab workers (professional or grad student) to remember their training once they've had it.  The comment essentially said that the OSHA was applying corporate/commercial lab rules and norms about training and expertise (basically, assume everyone is an idiot and train from the bottom up) in a situation where the fundamental assumption is that one is NOT an idiot.

What do those of you in the lab sciences think of that argument?

I think whoever is dismissing the need for training in an academic setting is bogus.  Most of my lab experience was as an undergraduate and we got training as needed with mandatory retraining at reasonable intervals (six months or a year, I can't remember now).  I remember in particular one could-have-been-fatal incident in the lab in which I was working (I was not present at the time) and that prompted extra training for everyone on lots of things.

If this lab had been cited recently for something related to this incident, then, yeah, the professor is somewhat liable for not putting the fear of god in his students.  I say "somewhat" liable because students are adults who are responsible for their own actions and no one can ride herd on someone at all times.  Someone who is wearing polyester while working with flammable things missed high-school lab safety; that's not a high-level, specialty knowledge and, yes, that's the student failing to take training to heart.

[notaprof]

Here is an article from today's Inside Higher Ed that has more discussion on this matter.

[eigen]

I'm torn on the issue (grad student in Chemistry). On the one hand, I think rigorous training is important, as is providing safety equipment. On the other hand, I feel that there's only so little that a PI can and should be responsible for in ensuring that all of his grad students follow through, all the time.

While they are "in training", at the same time they are developing as independent scientists. One of the major points that has come out of this is support for policies forbidding anyone from working in the lab alone- and while I agree that for many dangerous experiments, it is strongly advisable to have someone around, I couldn't get half of my work done if I could only come into the lab when there were others here. That means either no reactions that have to go overnight, or I have to drag someone else in at 2 or 3 am to check on them.

One of the other main consequences I see as a result of this is a lot more graduate students and staff being fired for lack of adherence to safety protocols.

As Poly mentioned, graduate students/research staff are adults, with a proper background responsible in large part for their own actions and decisions. Any person with a degree in chemistry working in an organic chemistry lab should know that t-butyl lithium is highly flamable. Not only is it common knowledge, it's very, very clearly marked on the bottle it's stored in. Especially being as she had done this exact same reaction before, I find it hard to believe that she had no idea it was flammable and air-sensitive.

I also believe that at the graduate student/staff level, it's the responsibility of the individual to properly check out the safety requirements of materials they are working with- at our university (and I'd imagine most, since it's OSHA requirements) one of the initial trainings is to read MSDS (material safety data sheets) as well as hazard codings on bottles. I train all of the undergraduates that work with me to take the time to sit down and read thoroughly all of the MSDS sheets before they start any experiment- knowing what you're working with, how hazardous it is, and what can be done to prevent/mitigate accidents is exceptionally important, but something that falls (in my opinion) to the individual performing/planning the experiments, rather than the PI or department.

[ucprof]

http://newsroom.ucla.edu/portal/ucla/campus-statement-regarding-criminal-221248.aspx

Probably worth posting the official campus response to this.

[notaprof]

I will admit to being very torn about this situation too but it seems to me that UCLA makes a big deal about there not being any willful violations but ignores the rest of OSHA's findings as mentioned in the link included in UCProf's link to the official response:

Sheharbano (Sheri) Sangji, 23, died from burns sustained in a chemical fire in UCLA's Molecular Sciences Building on Dec. 29, 2008. She was working with t-butyl lithium, a highly flammable compound that spontaneously burns upon exposure to air. Cal/OSHA said the plunger on the syringe she was using became dislodged, and the compound ignited and engulfed her clothing. Cal/OSHA said the lack of a lab coat was the single most significant factor in the severity of the burns that led to Sangji's death.
 
While concluding there were no willful violations, Cal/OSHA issued findings critical of UCLA's lab safety inspection follow-up, training and record-keeping programs and its failure to ensure the use of personal protective equipment and fined the campus $31,875. UCLA said it will not contest the findings or appeal the fine.

An OSHA investigation and felony charges seem like two very different things. Is there a specific legal definition of "willful" that might vary from the OSHA definition?  I am wondering if there have to be criminal charges attempted before the family could file for damages?  Given that the statute of limitations was about to run out, did they just quickly file something to keep their options open?  It seems like the OSHA findings would be very damaging to UCLA in a civil court. 

And there is nothing to indicate that the research assistant did not know that the chemical was flammable and that she was not following proper protocol. I have not read anything that placed the blame on her.  The wording "became dislodged" does not tell us if she dislodged the plunger on the syringe by accident or the syringe was faulty or may not have been made of a material appropriate for working with such a volatile chemical.  And then the university instigated these changes AFTER the accident:

Among the substantial changes made so far:
Flame-resistant lab coats have been purchased and are being distributed to laboratory personnel in the department of chemistry and biochemistry who work with flammable materials. Other labs will be required to make coats available whenever high-risk activities are performed.

Did they not have flame-resistant lab coats available before the accident?  They also state that training of the research assistant did occur but was not documented while OSHA found that she was not properly trained.  The victim cannot dispute whether or not proper training occurred.  I assume there must be fellow assistants who received training at the same time and can verify that Sheri also received this training?  There is just something in the tone of the UCLA response that comes across as offensive to me  "Why are you giving us a hard time about this?  Look at all the changes we have made since then to show that we care about safety."   But then I may be biased in this case.

[jackit_n_tyy]

Any safety program has to be supported by 'the system':  administrators, managers, supervisors, as well as users, and has to include well-defined, unambiguous procedures in the face of varying threats to physical safety. There is no such thing as an effective hazard-mitigation system that relies primarily on end users making case-by-case decisions about how to handle varying physical safety threats.  Is that the way it's always done?  No, and accidents like this happen as a consequence.

No one seems to be talking about the root causes of the accident.  Why was the employee performing such a dangerous process in such a hazardous manner (and I am not talking about just the issue of the lab coat.)?

It's really a completely inadequate response to safety to say:  I gave my employees plenty of information so that can make up their own minds about what to do when faced with a threat -- if they kill themselves it's their own damn fault.  Not only do standard procedures have to be put into place, it is always a supervisor's responsibility to ensure they are being followed.  This is not because 'people are not doing what they should do,' but because problems can occur that get in the way:  no lab coats in the lab, no procedure handbook available, no room in the hood, etc.  That approach to accident minimization (which often becomes 'blame the vicitim') was discarded long ago.  Hence, the legal implications.

A bright young PhD TT engineer in a dept where I worked a year ago was clearly creating a hazardous environment in his lab by leaving all kinds of tools (some running) and various metal pieces laying all over the lab floor.  These would actually spill out into the hallway!  He just could not understand my escalating complaints and demands that he clean up his mess.  I asked one of the guys working for him why they left the lab door open.  He said:  "If we get hurt we can yell for help."  Admittedly, that's the extreme end of the spectrum.  But still, there is a bit of the attitude in many scientists I've know:  buck up, be careful, don't be stupid.  Otherwise, just get it done.  That's not good hazard management.

[navelgazer]

The last time I learned anything about Chemistry was in high school, but I have a close friend who knows the lab and a husband who was in a lab where a graduate student using t-butyl lithium caused a fire. The most exciting thing about the fire was that my husband got to use a fire extinguisher. Everyone was fine.

Some points my friend and husband have made:
The lab coat would have helped a lot
She shouldn't have been working alone in the lab while working with this substance, and she would have known this with proper training
It doesn't seem like she knew how to quickly quench the fire
The specific accident (the dislodging) is something he and my friend have both been trained/warned about in labs.

My husband has been in four different labs with four different safety approaches. He has basically no sympathy for the school/professor, although I don't think he's in favor of jail time. It was their responsibility to make sure she knew safety procedures. She was not a student at the time, but an employee, so OSHA regulations certainly apply.