Mr. Yoo is tenured at Boalt Hall, and so Boalt ought to decide what is hackwork -- not professors at NYU or Georgetown or Harvard or Chicago, nor even professors of economics at Berkeley.
Fair point, but I still think it should be grounds for Boalt Hall to dismiss him. And this still doesn't mean professors anywhere can't make and express reasonably informed judgments (and recommendations_ about his general professional competency, though they have no ability or authority to dismiss him.
I'm not sure I follow your argument, because it seems that you are saying that this argument is about two contradictory things, so you might have skipped a "not". If I misunderstand you, I apologize and ask you to set me straight.
I meant there two different arguments have been made for the view that firing him is not a violation of free speech: 1) my argument that he would be fired for unethical action, not for speech, 2) other posters' argument that he would be fired for professional incompetence, not for speech.
But if this is not a violation of his academic freedom of speech, why is revocation of tenure the correct punishment? ...But what gives the university the right to rule on his conduct outside the university?
These are good questions. However, it's possible that employers should (and
do) in some cases make employment decisions on ethical issues not directly relevant to job competence. In my argument (1. above), I am suggesting that severe legal violations are indeed justified cause for dismissal, though I admit I don't know what the legal issues about such things are -- in academics or elsewhere. (My argument is an ethical, not a legal one).
The proponents of argument 2 above would, I suspect, argue that the university has the right to rule on his outside conduct if he acts in a professional role -- e.g., as an expert giving advice -- thus reflecting on his professional competence.
Your additional questions - the possible firing scenarios - are tough to answer, since the relationship between professional competence and popularity or acceptibility of actions and opinions is ambiguous. To some degree the professions judgments about competence reflect prejudices, biases, and unproven assumptions, yet without such judgments there is no profession.
Despite that ambiguity, then, we have to, on a case by case basis, distinguish as best we can the difference between someone who has done something unpopular or unethical and someone who has done something that reveals professional incompetence. Of your examples, only the last one seems plausible to me, but highly plausible: you have to be incompent
as a historian to deny the holocaust. Just as you have to be incompetent
as a lawyer (and as a logician) to recommend the legality of breaking the law.