A Bomb in Every Backyard
Wednesday, September 1, at 1 p.m., U.S. Eastern time
If more countries acquire nuclear weapons, is that a manageable headache or a full-scale catastrophe? A small but formidable group of scholars, known as "proliferation optimists," argues that there is no great need for worry. Nuclear weapons can increase world peace, they say, by making conventional wars less likely. Their opponents say that with each new nuclear state, the world runs a much higher risk of accidental war or terrorist-sponsored apocalypse. Much of the debate rests on empirical claims about how existing nuclear states actually behave. Will they build large arsenals or small ones? Will they keep careful track of their nuclear materials, or will they leave the door open to terrorists and smugglers? Which perspective is more persuasive?
» A Bomb in Every Backyard (9/3/2004)
Nathan E. Busch is an assistant professor of political science at Christopher Newport University, in Newport News, Va. His new book, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation (University Press of Kentucky), is a detailed study of how the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan organize and manage their nuclear arsenals.
David Glenn (Moderator):
Welcome to The Chronicle's live colloquy on nuclear proliferation. Our guest is Nathan Busch, who comes at this debate from an interesting angle: He has a great deal of knowledge about how the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan organize and manage their nuclear arsenals.
Many of the scholarly debates about the danger (or lack thereof) of nuclear proliferation -- and whether the outside world should take drastic steps to prevent, say, Iran or North Korea from going nuclear -- are based on predictions about what types of military strategies and organizational structures new nuclear states would probably use. Mr. Busch believes that his knowledge of the existing nuclear powers -- with their quietly terrifying everyday routines of weapons management -- offers important insights about the dangers of further proliferation.
Questions and comments are welcome -- please don't be shy.
Nathan E. Busch:
I’m delighted to be taking part in this colloquy and would like to thank The Chronicle for coordinating it. The issue of nuclear proliferation has long been an important issue, but there are few times when it has been more central to international security and U.S. foreign policy. Since September 11, 2001, there have been increasing concerns about nuclear terrorism, a war fought at least in part over Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and ongoing crises over Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs. But there is a great deal of disagreement over the risks involved with nuclear proliferation and what should be done to address this issue. I look forward to your questions and will do my best to answer them.
Question from David Glenn:
What lessons about military strategy do you believe countries like Syria, North Korea, and Iran have drawn from the Iraq war? All else equal, will the example of the Iraq war make those countries more likely or less likely to pursue nuclear programs?
Nathan E. Busch:
It has created mixed lessons. On the one hand, the war made very clear that the United States was serious about preventing nuclear proliferation and was prepared to engage in preventive strikes to do so. Libya took this lesson very seriously, and it was certainly one reason why it (more or less) came clean about its WMD programs. On the other hand, the difficulties that the United States has had in Iraq after the war might make them confident that the United States would not engage in such actions in the future.
But I think the biggest lesson that proliferating states might draw is the contrast between U.S. reactions to Iraq’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs. The United States went to war against Iraq, but did not against North Korea. This is because North Korea had the capability to destroy Seoul, South Korea, a key U.S. ally, with both conventional and possibly nuclear weapons. So the lesson is this: if you do push forward with a nuclear program, make sure you are successful. The United States might be more likely to carry out preventive strikes (to eliminate the programs), but would be less likely to carry out strikes once the country acquired the weapons.
Question from Mathew Kanjirathinkal, Park University:
I begin with the assumption that the construction and use of nuclear weapons are unequivocally wrong under any circumstnaces. Nuclear weapons should have never been invented or used. However, given their existence in today's world, is it realistic to expect nations not to try to acquire these weapons especially when they feel threatened by nuclear powers? Is it not the imbalance of power that makes war a tempting option to resolve conflicts? India and Pakistan are beleived to have refrained from starting another war because of mutual nuclear detrrrence. Similarly, wouldn't a nuclear powered Iraq have deterred the United and Britain from instigating the recent war against it?
Nathan E. Busch:
This question raises a number of interesting issues. First, as you note, if nations feel threatened by nuclear powers, it certainly creates strong incentives to develop nuclear weapons. But states have, in fact demonstrated nuclear restraint, even though they feel threatened. For example, after the Soviet Union collapsed, there were large numbers of nuclear weapons left in Ukraine. Needless to say, Ukraine was very concerned about Russia (a major nuclear power), but was willing to give up these weapons. But, you also raise some other interesting points. India and Pakistan have, in fact, fought a war in Kashmir in 1999--after their open demonstration of their nuclear power in 1998. While the situation never blew up into a full-scale war, it came very close. If the tide of the battle had not already turned in India’s favor, or if the United States had not stepped in, all evidence suggests that India would have been willing to cross into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir—an action that Pakistan would have viewed as a major invasion. Overall, I do not think that the situation between India and Pakistan has been anything close to stable after the introduction of nuclear weapons. Finally, on Iraq. The United States probably wouldn’t have invaded Iraq. But let’s shift the question a bit. One has to wonder whether Saddam Hussein would have demonstrated similar restraint. Or would he have wanted to invade Kuwait as he did in prior to the first Gulf War? Also, if Iraq were to acquire nuclear weapons, he could create incentives for his neighbors to rush to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. But nuclear optimists themselves argue that these kinds of rapid moves to develop nuclear weapons can create some of the greatest risks.
Question from David Glenn:
Kenneth Waltz and other "proliferation optimists" have argued that new nuclear states will probably not keep their arsenals on hair-trigger alert. Waltz has written, "A launch on warning policy makes no sense. If a country is struck, retaliation at leisure and calibration of one's response in an attempt to bring de-escalation is called for." But your study found that evidence both China and India might be tempted to adopt launch-on-warning policies. Why might those governments believe that such a posture might indeed make sense?
Nathan E. Busch:
Launch-on-warning policies allow a country to launch its weapons before incoming weapons strike their targets, potentially eliminating that country’s capability to retaliate. It is a striking fact that, despite Waltz’s arguments that these policies make no sense, the United States and the Soviet Union both developed the capabilities for launch-on-warning. Uncertainties about their ability to ride out a nuclear strike create strong incentives for any nuclear power to develop similar capabilities.
This holds true for both China and India. China currently has a small nuclear arsenal that could be highly vulnerable to a nuclear strike by a country with highly accurate missiles and excellent surveillance capabilities (such as the United States). Many Chinese military planners have been concerned that such a strike could eliminate their capability to retaliate, and scholars such as Harvard’s Iain Johnston have found “intriguing hints” of interest in launch-on-warning in the writings of Chinese military planners. Until recently, China’s capabilities fell far short of what would be required by a doctrine of launch-on-warning, but recent advances in China’s missile capabilities, early-warning systems, and command-and-control systems have brought China much closer to this goal.
Similarly, it is not clear that India would be confident in a ride-out-and-retaliate posture, especially since one of its regional rivals is China, whose nuclear capabilities significantly exceed India’s (and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future). India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine lays the foundation for a “survivable” arsenal of several hundred warheads deployed on missiles, aircraft, and ships; “robust” command-and control procedures and technologies; nuclear weapons stored in a high state of alert; and even a space-based early-warning system. While the Indian government has neither officially accepted nor rejected this doctrine, it is clear that nuclear hawks in India are pushing for deployed missiles and rapid-response capabilities, which would not be required by a policy of ride-out-and-retaliate.
Question from David Glenn:
In 2001, the writer Jonathan Schell wrote a call for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. "Because so few weapons can kill so many people," he wrote, "even far-reaching disarmament proposals would leave us implicated in plans for unprecedented slaughter of innocent people. The sole measure that can free us from this burden is abolition." Do you believe abolition is feasible and/or desirable? Why or why not?
Nathan E. Busch:
Unfortunately, I do not think this is a feasible option in the near future. It is highly unlikely that the United States would consider giving up its nuclear weapons while other countries still possess them, and vice versa. I believe a more promising option would, in fact, be far-reaching disarmament proposals, which would continue to move us in the direction of abolition.
Question from David Glenn:
If you could unilaterally redesign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, what changes would you enact, and why?
Nathan E. Busch:
One of the central weaknesses in the NPT has been in the assistance that the official nuclear weapons states have provided—and are required to provide—to the civilian nuclear programs (i.e., nuclear power plants) in non-nuclear weapon states. In many ways, this was the great bargain that gave states incentives not to develop nuclear weapons: they received civilian reactors in return for their agreement not to develop the weapons. The problem is when certain states decide to cheat on the NPT and use their civilian programs as a cover for weapons programs.
If I were to redesign the NPT, it would include measures to provide the fuel for the reactors and remove it afterwards to internationally-overseen storage facilities. This would go a long way in stopping covert weapons programs. But, of course, significant changes to the NPT are unlikely, and could create greater problems because they would require re-tooling and re-negotiating the treaty—which could cause the whole thing to unravel.
Question from David Glenn:
You are relatively hopeful about one particular point: It is unlikely, you write, that terrorist organizations currently have the ability to assemble a full-blown nuclear weapon (as opposed to a "dirty bomb") from scratch. How long do you think it might be before terrorist organizations develop such capabilities? Will nuclear blueprints someday become so widespread, and technology so cheap, that small groups of people can assemble their own weapons, assuming they can lay their hands on highly-enriched uranium?
Nathan E. Busch:
Building a nuclear weapon is a difficult thing to do, even if a terrorist group has acquired the necessary “fissile materials”—highly enriched uranium or plutonium—for the bomb. To build a nuclear weapon, a group must understand the physics of nuclear weapons designs, have the capabilities for precision machining of parts, have some proficiency with explosives, etc. It is a stretch to say that terrorist groups currently have that capability. There are currently a number of websites with designs for nuclear weapons, but of somewhat questionable designs. Kenneth Waltz is right to argue that many terrorists might be more inclined to attempt to develop chemical and biological weapons (or, alternatively, “dirty bombs”) rather than nuclear ones.
That being said, however, Al Qaeda and the Japanese sect Aum Shinrikyo have engaged in concerted efforts to acquire stolen fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons. So, while it might currently be beyond most, if not all, terrorist groups’ current capabilities to build a nuclear weapon from scratch, it would be foolish to rule out the possibility that with time, enough fissile materials, and a safe haven to do their work, a small, but well-trained terrorist group might eventually be successful. (This, by the way, underscores the need to continue disrupting terrorist networks and continue working to remove any safe-haven terrorist groups might be given by state sponsors.)
Question from David Glenn:
In 1996, the international-relations scholar David Karl wrote that there is probably no reason to fear a major nuclear arms race in South Asia, because "the lack of an extensive resource base will put the brakes on any plans to expand dramatically South Asia's nuclear programs. . ."
Has Karl turned out to be correct? How many weapons have India and Pakistan built since their first public nuclear tests in 1998? Do their nuclear programs in fact face serious resource constraints?
Nathan E. Busch:
In some ways David Karl is correct, in the sense that India and Pakistan have been engaged in what one might call a slow-motion nuclear arms race. Currently India has produced enough fissile materials for about 65 nuclear weapons and Pakistan has produced enough fissile materials for about 39 nuclear weapons. Economic and technological constraints have also limited their missile programs, so while those programs are making advances, they're much slower than the programs in more developed nuclear states like the United States or Russia. On the other hand, one has to also recognize the risks that arise from technical and economic constraints. In particular they will have fewer abilities to provide high technology security systems and use-control devices to maintain centralized control over their nuclear arsenal and related materials. These risks could be particularly high once India and Pakistan deploy their weapons on missiles. So for there to be risks of accidental and unauthorized use of weapons in South Asia, there does not need to be a major nuclear arms race. The slow-motion arms race is sufficient.
Question from David Glenn:
What steps should diplomats and international organizations take in their effort to prevent Iran and North Korea from becoming full-fledged nuclear states? Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe military action might be justified?
Nathan E. Busch:
Military action cannot ever simply be ruled out in international affairs, and there are instances where the United States and other powers might consider military action to eliminate the nuclear programs in proliferating states. For example, if North Korea were to begin selling its nuclear technologies—something that it has threatened to do—or if Iran were to use its nuclear program as a shield for its increased support for terrorism, these would constitute “red lines” where military actions might be justified.
That being said, there are a number of steps that the United States and the international community can take to help stop these programs before they become fully developed. These include increased efforts to prevent the exports of technologies that could be used in nuclear programs, and greater efforts to stop and search suspect shipments (this program is known as the Proliferation Security Initiative). There are also various diplomatic pressures that can be applied to Iran and North Korea to encourage them to stop their programs, such as economic sanctions.
These tools can only be effective if the international community shows resolve on these issues, however, and so far there has not been tremendous reason for optimism.
David Glenn (Moderator):
We're halfway through our allotted hour. Questions and comments are still encouraged. . . what themes are we neglecting here?
Question from Hugh Gusterson, MIT:
The article in the Chronicle frames the question here as about the proliferation, rather than the abolition, of nuclear weapons: will we be more or less safe if more countries get the Bomb? In my own book, People of the Bomb, I argue that we have a racist double standard which leaves us assuming that its more dangerous for black and brown people to have nuclear weapons than it is for us. The article presents you as a "pessimist" about the safety of proliferation, and my own position is that human beings (no matter their color) and nuclear weapons cannot coexist indefinitely without catastrophe. Does your "pessimism" lead you to support abolition of nuclear weapons, or do you think that the US can retains its bombs while dnying then to others?
Nathan E. Busch:
The double-standard charge is a common charge that is often leveled against critics of the nuclear programs in South Asia and elsewhere. And, I agree, this criticism is at times justified. In my book, however, I do not at all assume that nuclear weapons are safe for us, but dangerous for others. I consider myself an “equal-opportunity” pessimist--to varying degrees, I find difficulties with the safety and security procedures in all the cases I studied, including the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Some of the most dire risks of loss of materials, for example, exist in Russia. Do I think that some states have better controls over their arsenals and fissile material stockpiles, and have smaller risks of inadvertent war, than others? Yes, I think there is plenty of evidence for that. But do I simply think that the nuclear weapons in our hands are “safe”? Absolutely not. I do not necessarily make the argument for complete abolition at this point, however, but argue that, at least in the near future, signifiant steps must be make for deep and permananent cuts in current nuclear arsenals.
Question from David Glenn:
If we want to maximize peace and security in a nuclear world, is it better for nuclear states to have very public, explicit nuclear doctrines that spell out when they will and will not use their weapons? Or would the world be safer if nuclear states were ambiguous about their nuclear doctrines?
Nathan E. Busch:
In almost all cases, it is better for nuclear states to have public, explicit nuclear doctrines. This way there is less chance for miscalculation, confusion, or a misunderstanding of another country's intentions, particularly during crisis situations. Furthermore, the nuclear doctrines, operations, and command-and-control systems would be more clear to one's own policy-makers, soldiers, etc., thereby reducing risks of accident or unauthorized use.
Question from David Glenn:
Some scholars have argued that states try to acquire nuclear weapons not only because of security concerns but also because of domestic politics. Once a weapons program reaches a certain stage, according to this argument, "nuclear pork" takes over, and it becomes difficult for a government to say no to its military-industrial complex. What do you think of that model? Did you find anything in your study that supports or disproves that hypothesis?
Nathan E. Busch:
I think there is a lot to this argument. This is especially the case where the nuclear programs are isolated from much external oversight. Perhaps one of the strongest examples of this is in India, where only a few policy-makers and the nuclear establishment have historically made most of the decisions. Of course, in Pakistan (and to a lesser degree, China) the government is the military-industrial complex. But a similar case could be made in Russia and the United States as well.
Question from David Glenn:
Some scholars have suggested that the United States should give away some of its high-tech weapons-control tools, such as "permissive action" devices, to newly proliferating countries like India and Pakistan. Do you support that idea? Why or why not?
Nathan E. Busch:
This option creates a number of difficulties. First, providing such assistance in effect condones those programs, effectively eliminating any pressure to give them up. But, possibly more importantly, there are a number of risks—especially in India and Pakistan—that are more serious than the possibility of accidental or unauthorized launches. The most serious risks in South Asia involve crises spinning out of control. Providing use-control devices would not alleviate these risks, and could even exacerbate them. Improved command-and-control technologies such as these could encourage emerging nuclear powers to deploy their weapons higher states of readiness, increasing the regional tensions and the likelihood of miscalculations and even intentional use during crises. I would however, suggest providing India and Pakistan with technologies to help them secure fissile material stockpiles, protect nuclear power facilities, etc. The only problem is that they have not been receptive to U.S. offers of assistance in this arena.
Question from Robert, University of Chicago:
The provision of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which allows for the development of the "peaceful" development of nuclear technology, is a loophole that presents a terrible problem. The provision was used by India a few decades ago essentially as a cover to develop and test its first nuclear device. Today, it seems that the provision is being used by Iran for similar ends. What are the biggest roadblocks to revision of the NPT?
Nathan E. Busch:
What you say is absolutely true. It was also used by North Korea, Iraq and Libya. Simply put, the biggest road block to revision of the NPT is the NPT itself. In other words, it would be extremely difficult to re-negotiate the treaty at this point. It is just as likely to fall apart as for any real strengthening to take place. Unfortunately, a broken system might be better than none at all. The most likely avenue for strengthening the regime would be to improve the oversight capabilities of such agencies as the International Atomic Energy Agency, improve controls over exports of technologies that could be used in nuclear weapons, etc.
Question from David Glenn:
What have been the strengths and weaknesses of the Nunn-Lugar program? To what extent have Russian nuclear materials become more secure during the last five years? Has the U.S. government been investing enough resources in this project?
Nathan E. Busch:
The Nunn-Lugar program has made a great deal of progress over the last decade, and the United States has provided a great deal of money and resources to this program. In the FY2004 Budget, for example, Congress approved $225 million for programs to help improve the security of Russian fissile materials.
But a great deal still needs to be done. A recent Harvard University study found that of the 600 metric tons of material potentially at risk in Russia, these programs had provided extensive security upgrades for only 22% of the material, and had only completed initial, “rapid” upgrades (such as putting bars on windows, reinforcing doors, and installing radiation detectors at entrances to facilities) for 43%. Given the grave risks of a loss of these materials, more concerted effort needs to be directed to addressing this problem.
There also needs to be more emphasis on improving the “security culture” in Russia. In a number of instances, U.S. scientists have discovered improper use of the security systems that have been installed at Russian facilities. In some cases, Russian workers bypassed critical procedures or even turned off security systems because they decided there were too many false alarms. This demonstrates that, in addition to providing necessary security technology, the Nunn-Lugar Program should also devote more effort to training Russian scientists, organizing workshops to emphasize the importance of nuclear security, etc.
Question from David Glenn:
In retrospect, it seems miraculous that there was no accidental or inadvertant nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union during the peak years of the Cold War. What lessons should be drawn from that apparent success?
Nathan E. Busch:
The lesson: we were lucky. Studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, suggest that there were a number of near-misses, false alarms, and organizational snafus that could have led to disaster. (See, for example, the work of Scott Sagan, David Welch, and Peter Feaver on some of these difficulties). During the Cold War, both sides did take precautions against accidents, and inadvertent war, but they also took many risks as well.
Question from Megan M., UGA:
In 2003, the United States led a war against Iraq that was at least in part over Iraq's WMDs. But to date, no significant stockpiles of these weapons have been found. What happened to them?
Nathan E. Busch:
This issue will haunt U.S. and international intelligence agencies for a good while to come. Unfortunately, it is also an issue that has become so politically charged that few people approach it objectively. Many critics argue, for example, that this is a charge that was “trumped up” by the Bush administration. On the contrary, long before the invasion of Iraq was a real possibility, U.S. intelligence agencies (including during the Clinton administration), the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), and foreign intelligence agencies (including France and Germany) all agreed that Saddam Hussein’s regime was still actively interested in acquiring WMD, and was probably pushing forward with these programs--especially after weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998.
For instance, in October 2002, the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate suggested that Iraq was retaining the capability for producing nuclear weapons. The main speedbump was in obtaining the fissile materials, but that Iraq could probably acquire nuclear weapons in the later half of this decade (they thought he was much farther along on chemical and biological weapons). As you note, after the war, no significant stockpiles have been found. But there has not been sufficient press coverage of what has been found by the Iraq Survey Group, the organization officially charged with studying Iraq’s WMD programs. Although it appears that Hussein’s regime was devoting most of his efforts to delivery systems for WMD (including missiles of ranges that clearly violated UN Security council resolutions), the ISG reported that it “discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002.” Regarding the nuclear program, the former director of the ISG, David Kay, reported in October 2003 that “the testimony we have obtained from Iraqi scientists and senior government officials should clear up any doubts about whether Saddam still wanted to obtain nuclear weapons. They have told ISG that Saddam Husayn remained firmly committed to acquiring nuclear weapons.” The ISG found documents and equipment hidden in scientists' homes that would have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment and “found indications that there was interest, beginning in 2002, in reconstituting a centrifuge enrichment program.”
This estimate has been confirmed in more recent reports by the ISG. In March 2004, ISG director Charles Duelfer reported that “the ISG has developed information that suggests Iraqi interest in preserving and expanding the knowledge needed to design and develop nuclear weapons.”
Question from Bob, University of Chicago:
If a terrorist group used against the United States a nuclear device, which the group had assembled through piecemeal assistance (e.g., fissile material from one state, engineering assistance from the scientists of another, etc.), how would the United States respond? It's one thing if one state clearly helps a group gain nuclear capability. It's another thing if several states--some purposively, some unwittingly--do the same. How would one even begin to assign responsibility?
Nathan E. Busch:
That's a good question. It would be extremely difficult to assign responsibility, especially if much of the assistance was unwitting. The clearest steps would be to determine which of the assistance was intentional and which was not. If it was assistance by a state (assuming we could acquire this information), then it would be easy to assign responsibility. In most instances, however, the technology would be from certain companies, a few individuals, etc., and this information is much harder to track down. But your question highlights the need for stricter controls over exports of these technologies from industrialized countries, and greater efforts to prevent countries (such as Pakistan) from intentionally exporting these technologies.
Question from David Glenn:
Another theory holds that countries pursue nuclear weapons for reasons of "national grandeur." Stanford's Scott Sagan and others have suggested that France went nuclear in the 1950s in order to relieve the intense cultural anxiety it felt after its global empire collapsed. Only with a bomb, according to this theory, could France still feel like a significant player on the world stage.
Do you believe that something like this might help to explain North Korea's and Iran's nuclear programs? Or are those programs better explained with traditional realist models of international security?
Nathan E. Busch:
I think it best explains India's desire for nuclear weapons. While India is concerned about its security (especially vis-a-vis Pakistan and China) it also is very aware that the major powers in the world--and the permanent members of the security council--also happen to be nuclear weapons states. I think North Korea views its nuclear program as a tool that could be used in one or two possible ways: First, it is, in fact, very much concerned (one might even say, obsesed) with self-reliance and security. But it also appears to view its nuclear program as a bargaining chip, which is very useful for wresting money and other assistance from the rest of the world. So far, it hasn't needed to choose between the two. Iran, on the other hand, does appear to be concerned about its security. Iran's nuclear weapons could also be used as a means of protecting itself from retaliation as it continues to support terrorism throughout the world.
Question from Andrew Mytelka, Chronicle of Higher Education:
Are issues of nuclear proliferation getting the attention they deserve in academe? Are the scholars in this area getting their books published and winning tenure?
Nathan E. Busch:
Hmm. You've hit something of a sore spot. The simple answer: no. After the end of the cold war, nuclear issues--and security issues generally--have been marginalized in academia. As far as I know, there have only been a handful of scholars (I can actually only think of one or two) who have made it to tenure, or even tenure-track positions. I know of many who have had to leave academia.
Question from Michael Greisman, The Chronicle of Higher Education:
Are there respectable odds on a nuclear exchange taking place at a certain time?
Nathan E. Busch:
I'm not a betting man, myself. But for the past several years, the greatest risks, by far, have been in South Asia. They narrowly avoided a major war in 1999, during the Kargil War, and in 2002 engaged in a massive buildup of over a million troops along the Line of Control in Kashmir. At the time, George Tenet stated that "The chance of war between these two nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971." In recent months, there has been a warming of relations between the two countries, but such changes have proven to be fragile in the past, easily soured again by terrorist attack by Pakistani-sponsored militants.
Question from Richard Byrne, Chronicle of Higher Education:
One of the fascinating point raised by a graphic that accompanied the article was the notion of a nuclear "neighborhood." Though the great powers have essentially shrunken the world to a neighborhood in their ability to project nuclear force, the graphic showed that the possibilities of regional instability as neighbors go nuclear is great. Do we downplay questions of regional instability -- and the ability of new nuclear players' capacity to project nuclear force -- in such discussions?
Nathan E. Busch:
The issue of regional instability is a serious one, and it has often made its way into the proliferation debate. Regional rivalries are particularly volitile due to the short flight times for missiles and even bombers. This creates great risks of miscalculation and inadvertent war, as decision makers have very limited time to decide what responses to take. Just to drive this point home: in South Asia, the flight times for bombers to reach major targets is roughly 10 minutes; once India and Pakistan deploy their warheads on missiles, the flight times will be 3-5 minutes. This creates a highly volatile situation. I personally doubt that, if the United States and the Soviet Union had been regional rivals, we would have escaped the Cold War without nuclear war.
Nathan E. Busch:
Well, on that cheerful note, I will wrap things up. Thank you all very much for your insightful questions.
David Glenn (Moderator):
We'll end with the immortal words of Dr. Strangelove: "The entire point of doomsday machine is lost if you keep it a secret." Many thanks to Nathan Busch for taking time to be with us today.
Copyright © 2009 by The Chronicle of Higher Education