I frankly was disappointed by the forum in the Quarterly. It appears that roughly 25 pages were given to Mr. Bellesiles and roughly 25 pages were subdivided among Jack Rakove, Gloria Main, Ira D Gruber, Randolph Roth.

Jack Rakove took 6 pages to discuss the applicability of Arming America to the Second Amendment. While I agree with Rakove that Bellesile's criticisms of the militia is a major part of Arming America (see my early posts on this thread), I didn't think Rakove's article was a critique of Arming America --which should surprise no one given Rakove's past writings.

Gloria Main and Randolph Roth appeared to have made reasonably good critiques in their areas (probate records and colonial homicides) although I'm not qualified to judge. Certainly I found their material of interest -- Bellesiles didn't seem to fully respond to Gloria Mains comments. I was very disappointed with Ira Gruber's treatment of the main area I was interested in -- Bellesiles' treatment of American militia. Mr. Gruber uses up 2 of 5 pages in simply summarizing Bellesiles major points in Arming America. This was unnecessary --we have read the book and similar summaries have been widely disseminated in the book reviews/newspapers.

In the remaining three or so pages, Mr. Gruber makes some blunt criticisms of Bellesiles --e.g., for a "consistently biased reading of sources and on careless uses of evidence and context". However, the substance of Mr. Gruber's criticisms end up seeming small because he doesn't really cite specific examples from Arming America to support his criticisms. Depending on one's view, this vagueness is either unfair to Bellesiles or is letting Bellesiles off lightly.

Gruber also says "historians ...have agreed that the militia was not an effective military force." I'm not sure how to interpret this. Certainly some of the militias performed badly on occasion. However, My understanding is that multiple historians have found that the militias overall were an effective force, although not designed to fight standup battles on open terrain. The US Army's Center of Military History's "American Military History" (CMH/AMH) indicates that the Militia's contribution was great -- that the militias played a pivotal role in several major battles. They also rendered British victories irrelevant by keeping political control of areas not actually occupied by the British army --and hence made the war unprofitable for the British (i.e., Brits would never be able to reestablish commerce and collect enough profits/taxes to justify their expensive military adventure. ) A third role is that the militia hampered British movement away from the seaports/coastal rivers by constantly cutting British supply lines.

Decades ago, John Shy, in A People Numerous and Armed, explained how the militia turned North America into King George's unwinnable Vietnam. Bellesiles' attempt to take refuge in George Washington's comments is funny -- The Combat Studies Institute at the US Army's Command and General Staff College has a monograph criticizing George Washington's prejudice against use of militias. (The Institute has a research project on the synergistic benefits of using regular and irregular forces together -- as is happening in Afghanistan today. )

The relative effectiveness of the militias can be debated -- John Shy indicates that South Carolinian representative Aedanus Burke and Alexander Hamilton quarreled publicly over who -- Continental Line or militias -- contributed most to winning the Southern Campaign. What I think is less debatable is Bellesiles' extremely negative portrayal of militia performance in specific battles vs the detailed accounts given by other historians and by primary sources (Fischer(Concord), Babits(Cowpens), Remini(1815 Battle of New Orleans). ) As I noted earlier, my opinion is that Bellesiles' descriptions are so biased that they cross over the line from arguable interpretation to deliberately misleading the reader.

I also think Bellesiles ignores material contrary to his thesis -- he doesn't discuss the Militia victory at King's Mountain even though the US Army's CMH/AMH indicates that it was the pivotal turning point in the Revolutionary War. King's Mountain destroyed the British strategy to gain political control of the South -- a significant part of Cornwallis' forces (albeit Loyalist militia) was destroyed and the Carolinian Loyalists were terrorized into docility because they realized that the British Army could not protect them from the Patriot militia's retaliation. King's Mountain also kept the support of the French -- including much needed loans -- as the French realized that the British could never suppress the Patriot guerrillas. This happened in 1780 -- when the Southern Continental Army had been trapped and destroyed at Charleston, the Continental money had become almost worthless, and Washington's army rotted outside New York City with 3 year enlistments expiring, mutinies breaking out, and Congress unable to support them with supplies. Plus, let's not forget Benedict Arnold when we are extolling the merits of the Continentals over the militias.

In the war of 1812, Bellesiles makes much of the militia allowing Washington DC to be burned by the British Expedition but doesn't note that the same expedition got it's clock cleaned and it's commander killed when it then went up against the Maryland militia at Baltimore. He also doesn't discuss the victory of the Kentucky militia at the Thames River (Great Lakes)in 1813 or the embarrassing defeats suffered by several Regular Army units in the first two years of the war. In an earlier post, I noted why I think Bellesiles depiction of the 1815 Battle of New Orleans is false.

Given his stature and life's work, I was disappointed that Mr. Gruber did not engage this subject more fully -- not because I cared whether he supported my personal view against Bellesiles' but because I hoped for more insight and information from him...

In reviewing this "summary", I realized that what I intended to describe as a constitutional mechanism could be interpreted as concern over a present danger. That was not my intent.

The present government is legal and benign --and is likely to remain so for at least a decade. My concern is that if gun control measures today create a registration database of gunowners, then said database allows confiscation of all private firearms 15 years down the road (e.g., as has occurred in England and Australia.) A disarmed populace would then be helpless 10 years after confiscation if oppressive measures were adopted during a major economic depression. I basically see private firearms as a mechanism preserving the peace similar to the nuclear MAD doctrine. For example, consider this country's response to the Great Depression compared to that of Nazi Germany and Italy. The mere fact of widespread firearms ownership deterred the powerful from considering oppressive measures in the 1930s (leaving aside MacArthur's military attack on the Bonus Army in DC).

-- Don Williams, MS, Computer Science (posted 3/14, 10:45 a.m., U.S. Eastern time)

previous response

next response

STEP 1: Your contact information (required)

Your name: Your title & institution: Your phone: Your e-mail address:

STEP 2: Your comments

STEP 3: Submit!

Be sure to include your name and affiliation. Legitimate requests for anonymity will be honored.

The Chronicle maintains Colloquy as an open forum where readers can comment on issues. Submissions may be condensed or edited for clarity, but editing is kept to a minimum. We correct errors in spelling, punctuation, etc. In addition, we remove statements that have the potential to be libelous or to slander someone. In cases in which people make claims that could be libelous, we will remove the names of institutions and departments. But in those cases, we will not alter the ideas contained in the submissions.

Please read our privacy policy or our Colloquy help page if you have questions.

Check this box only if you would like this submission to be considered for publication as a letter to the editor in the printed Chronicle.