As near as I can figure out, Mr. Schuster postulates his whole "ethical" or "moral" case -- the two are not the same, and I am not certain which he really means -- upon a proper English noun being the property (by "rights") of the group to which the name refers. In turn, this is based on a series of factual and logical fallacies.

The first fallacy is the "nominative fallacy" -- the assumption that a particular name indicates some sort of ontological existence. Indeed, this fallacy is so widespread in the study of American Indian history that it is a true curse upon the field.

I do not have references at hand, and must cite from memory. Anyone truly interested in the matter is directed to the just published, or soon to be published, Plains volume of the Smithsonian's Handbook of North American Indians, where, I suspect, the Sioux name is likely to get the most complete scholarly treatment it has ever had.

Roughly, however, the Chippewa (or Ojibwa) used a long word, generally translated as "snake," not for a specific group of people, but for all those people in a particular direction who were their enemies. While likely the larger portion of these "snakes" were speakers of "the Sioux language," there is, I think, a very high probability that at least some of the people referred to were non-Sioux speakers. The French, on contact with the Chippewa, adopted the Chippewa term, but shortened it. Later the British Anglecized the French word.

The formation of the political entities more or less included now in the name "Sioux" was a very late development, whether one is concerned with the formation of all the entities within the three dialectical groups recognized for the Sioux language, or only the seven tribes commonly recognized for the western, or Lakota dialect (which has been the main focus of his discussion). Harry Anderson, in a brilliant paper on the "Saones" (roughly Sawons in English) in the journal of the Washington (D.C.) Academy of Sciences, about 1955, showed that as late as the 1830s, the seven Lakota-speaking tribes were still proto-organizations, not distinct tribal entities.

A similar process of ethnic group formation is evident in all parts of the world where non-state societies have come into contact with states, usually first through just their citizens, and only later thorough the official representatives of the states. "Sioux" was not a name originally used for self-identification by any of the people who were ancestral to the people now self-identified as "Sioux." "The Sioux people" became such only in response to influences from the outside.

In the tribal world, it is extremely common for the self-identifying tribal name to mean "people" or "human beings." In reality, the names usually have further implications which are not directly translated. These mean, more or less:"We are the only real human beings, and thus superior to all other tribes." This, in essence, is the highest moral principle of tribalism-- no matter the (sometimes obviously conflicting) principle of (usually) ascribing a "mysterious" or "sacred" essence to all things.

Mr. Schuster claims that there has been no response to his question of specification of a moral or ethical principle supporting the continued use of the name "Fighting Sioux." Because he cannot see it does not mean, however, that such principle has not been specified. But it should be made clear that I am not advocating a particular position. Implicitly, at least some of the people who have supported the continued use of the mascot name are saying: "This issue is enough. I value the traditional American principles of nationhood more than the outlook of tribalism." This is a position which will be ignored at only at great social costs.

There is one more thing to be said about moral positions. I believe there are huge numbers of particular statements from many religions and philosophies which are, in most situations, applicable everywhere in the world. These include such statements as: "Do unto others and you would have them do unto you." But I also believe that only the severely mentally challenged cannot think of necessary exceptions to every one of these statements -- where the following of a particular moral or ethical principle will lead to quite the "wrong thing."

Now for Mr. Schuster's second fallacy. There is simply no parallel in the Sioux name and that of a corporation founded to market particular products or services. And this raises another point. Suppose "the Sioux" were able to trademark this name. Does he really believe that they would not try to license it far and wide? This marketing, of course, if I follow Mr. Schuster's line of argument, would then be, for him, a moral or ethical good.

I hope Mr. Schuster will further inform me about his position on stereotypes. I have yet been able to make little sense of what he has said in regard to them.

-- Melburn D. Thurman (posted 5/4, 5:45 p.m., U.S. Eastern time)

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