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Professor Ryan asks (At what point can we dispense with the titles? I'm beginning to feel that I've known most of the people here all my life.) me why I call weak falsification "weak" if it is as "powerful" as strong falsification (powerful in the sense of belief formation, I think he means). My answer: I don't know. I chose the term without much reflection, and it's a fact that the term "weak falsification" is used by others, in other contexts, to mean something different. I could have, and perhaps should have, chosen some more neutral terms, such as alpha-falsification and beta-falsification. In my view, nothing much hangs on the term.
More interesting is Ryan's next argument, "The facts about our observations of the computer guts are also consistent with it being run by etch-a-sketch, as well as with it being run by magic! 'It is run by etch-a-sketch' is logically consistent with 'I seem to observe its parts and find no etch-a-sketch.' The reason is that the falsity of the magic hypothesis, which you take as merely weakly falsified, you assume when you conclude that the etch-a-sketch hypothesis is strongly falsified."
If I may paraphrase Ryan's point in my own words, it is that each case of strong falsification presupposes weak falsification of alternative hypotheses. I'm not sure that this shows that there is no distinction between the two, or only that any given strong falsification logically presupposes weak falsification. I'm not sure that we need to pursue the question of what is the best way to characterize the situation. Ryan puts it as follows: "As I've been arguing, any putative case of weak falsification can be redescribed as strong, and vice versa." I'm willing to go with that, for the sake of the argument. What it doesn't show, however, is that ID is not falsifiable, nor does it show that ID is falsified.
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- -- Todd Moody, assoc. professor of philosophy, St. Joseph's University (posted 2/14, 2:00 p.m., U.S. Eastern time)
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