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Prof. Moody, we may as well say, "Observations do not prove that a magician is not causing your experience of reading a computer screen now, but only that you need not suppose a magician is involved in order to account for the phenomenon. That's weak falsification."
By Jove, into the 500's, we're still making interesting headway here. There are some epistemological disagreements underlying hundreds of the previous postings. I don't see a weak-strong falsification distinction. Believing in such a distinction might give someone false hope that ID is still holding on to plausibility...
Prof. Okimoto, may I suggest that you meant all along to argue that ID is meaningless, having no criteria of what would count as observational evidence for it? You'd be locating yourself in the general neighborhood of Logical Positivism, a sensible region in which to live which I occupy myself, though not about this particular issue. I think ID's false, you think it can't be because it's meaningless.
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- -- Jim Ryan, philosophy prof., Huron College (posted 2/11, 5:20 p.m., U.S. Eastern time)
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