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In New Partnership, James Madison U. Offers Credit for Online Rosetta Stone Course

October 13, 2011, 4:40 pm

One of the most buzzed-about experiments in higher education lately is StraighterLine, a company that offers online versions of introductory courses and works in partnership with universities that award credit to students for completing them.

That idea is spreading.

With less fanfare, a similar deal was recently signed between James Madison University and the language-learning company Rosetta Stone. The public university in Virginia will grant credit to online-only students who complete a 16-week introductory conversational Spanish course produced and largely managed by Rosetta Stone, which sells one of the world’s most popular language-learning programs.

Hundreds of universities already use Rosetta Stone software in their language courses. But this goes further. The partnership marks the first time a university in the United States has offered credit to students who complete a Rosetta Stone program, according to Cathy Quenzer, the company’s senior director of education.

The customized course follows a syllabus approved by both the company and the university, and James Madison officials say their faculty worked with Rosetta Stone to modify the program to meet learning outcomes that are required of campus-based students. In the class, though, the role of the university’s faculty is limited to “spot-checking” to ensure that the course is progressing smoothly, and to entering grades for students at the end of the semester.

Those students learn largely by interacting with the Rosetta Stone software. Lessons take place in an online environment heavy on images. Students are prompted to speak while engaging in simulated virtual activities like hiking, for example. Voice-recognition features compare their pronunciation to that of native speakers. Students also converse live with native Spanish speakers employed by Rosetta Stone and play educational games developed by the company. And a Rosetta Stone “success team” monitors each student’s progress.

The whole package—software, tuition, and application fee—costs $679. Students pay Rosetta Stone directly, and James Madison gets $380 per student.

The partnership grows from a longstanding relationship between the university and the company, which was co-founded by a former James Madison computer-science professor, John Fairfield. Both are rooted in the Shenandoah Valley city of Harrisonburg, Va.: The university is the largest employer in town, and Rosetta Stone is the second largest.

But the deal does not extend to traditional James Madison students who might want to take the online course. The new Rosetta Stone course, which has enrolled just a dozen students so far, is offered through a continuing-education-style department that serves nontraditional students. Those classes are off-limits to on-campus students, says Carol Fleming, James Madison’s director of outreach and engagement.

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  • goxewu

    So, bottom line, it’s a matter of tactics, not truth. The New (Uppity) Atheists might well be right that science disproves religion (or at least demonstrates that religion is a cloud-cuckooland all to itself in which, as they say, anything goes and usually does), but if they want to have believers go easy on their efforts to insinuate baseline religious beliefs (“creationism,” “intelligent design”) into public school curricula, they have to pretend that the difference between science and religion is trivial, or just a matter of taste. Do I have it right?

  • mavprof

    The “bottom line” of Mr Ruse’s argument, as he has it, “not that religion is true, but that science does not refute traditional religion–Christianity and so forth.” This statement does seem to refute the New Atheist claim that “science disproves religion,” as stated in goxewu’s unwarranted implication that Mr Ruse might not differ in principle from the New Atheist position, but he might only be refuting it for tactical reasons. From there comes goxewu’s bit where he takes it back and applies the sneering mockery often found in preemptory New Atheist dismissals of religion. I think Mr Ruse has made it clear that he finds the methodological naturalism of the scientist not incompatible with theism, though he himself is not a theist. Do I have it right?

  • mavprof

    Mr Ruse’s views seem in general compatible with a NYT reporter’s assessment of statements of authors and contributors alike in the publication of the US National Academy of Sciences “Science, Evolution, and Creationism” (2008) that “attempts to pit science and religion against each other create controversy where none needs to exist.” Of course this sensible via media position that the practice of science and religion are compatible was bound to raise the hackles both of anti-evolution creationists and New Atheists like Richard Dawkins who seem agreed in insisting that evolutionary science and religion necessarily represent incompatible and competing world views.

  • walsh05

    Though interesting I will not discuss the issues about the debate over the first amendment and the questions they raise. I do, though, want to express thanks to Professor Ruse for his careful explanation of his view, and his continuing helpfulness in these discussions. Having visited some of the blogs to which he refers and followed the contours of the debate, I agree that he has been treated unfairly by (some of) the New Atheists and am myself surprised by the dogmatic, meanspirited, ideological, and often just poor arguments made against him. As an atheist I find this aspect of the issue rather frustrating. His critics don’t seem to realize that making the same arguments, but more loudly each time, does not make them any stronger. Ruse’s view of religion is surely the more sensible one in these discussions.

  • suomynona

    It may be a pedestrian point (in support of Ruse’s arguments), but it should be made nonetheless: whether religion is ‘true’ or not according to science doesn’t much matter in light of the fact that it’s ‘true’ and influential in the social sense. New Atheists like Dawkins, among others who would apotheosize empirical truth, simply can’t grasp the fact that what we all sloppily refer to as ‘culture’ can’t be reduced to a set of correct or incorrect responses to scientifically validated information. Until the Dawkinses of the world let go of the rather naive worldview that human behavior should be driven by scientific knowledge (as opposed to human knowledge, though the two sometimes overlap), they will have little success in helping to ween people off of the pernicious *social* effects of their beliefs, scientific or otherwise.

  • goxewu

    Mavprof does have it right regarding Prof. Ruse’s accommodationism. And I have it right as to the tactical reason for Prof. Ruse’s accommodationatism. We both have it right. There’s a first.

    Prof. Ruse is undoubtedly a nice guy. He’s a nonbeliever, but he wants to let believers go their own way (Gee, I wish believers would let non-believers go their own way, too)–partly because he’s genuinely for let and let live, but partly as tactic: Tell them that believing is perfectly compatible with science and they’ll be mollified enough to quit pushing creationism in the public schools.

    Religious belief is anything-goes because there are no standards, no agreed-upon methods of testing/prediction, etc. Science may have factions and scientists may disagree, but it’s nothing like the span from Mormonism (the fastest-growing religion in the country) through Orthodox Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism all the way over to wiccan and a bunch of others. Just as religions claim science can’t disprove their supernatural claims, one religion can’t disprove another religion’s supernatural claim, either. I used to say to the Mormon and Jehova’s Witnesses proselytizers on my doorstep, “You guys get together with the local rabbi and imam and whomever else, come up with common platform, and get back to me.”

    The biggest trouble with the New Atheists for Old Religionists is that they’ve started to act like the Old Religionists. Next thing you know, they’ll be knocking on your door, handing out pamphlets, building tax-empt commercial empires, pleading that some kind of atheist canon law delays civil prosecution, holding national non-prayer breakfasts, and the like. Couldn’t have that. The turf is nicely divided up as it is. No newcomers.

  • mavprof

    Several observations on goxewu’s newest claims:

    Neither Mr Ruse’s nor the National Academy of Sciences positions on science and religion hardly seem palatable to most creationists or to intelligent design proponents (or to New Atheists), so while an accommodating position may influence some, I don’t expect many fundamentalists, creationists, or groups like the Family Research Council et al to relent in their efforts to influence public opinion on a number of issues, including the teaching of creation science or intelligent design in schools as alternatives to standard evolutionary science.

    The suggestion that Mr Ruse’s position is in large part due to his being “a nice guy” with a “live and let live” disposition reeks of condescension and trivializes his philosophical position that methodological naturalism may be separated from metaphysical naturalism. Furthermore, I suspect this has been his position for some time, and not part of some recent attempt to palliate believers.

    Another questionable claim is that there are “no standards” or “agreed-upon methods” to bear upon religious belief as if, for Christians, biblical textual scholarship, biblical archeology, etc., or philosophical argument for that matter, have no influence on acceptance (or rejection) of belief. As if as well one should expect unanimity of beliefs or of methodological approaches among historians, philosophers, or experts in jurisprudence. And some philosophers and historians of science such as Michael Polanyi have argued similarities in thinking, e.g., in moral commitment or commitment to universality, common to both scientists and religious believers,

  • goxewu

    To the wonderful list of oxymorons, which includes “military intelligence” and “gourmet delicatessen,” we can now add “metaphysical naturalism.”

    There are obviously “no standards” or “agreed-upon methods” brought to bear on religious beliefs. Otherwise, some kind of consensus among admittedly highly intelligent, erudite, and erstwhile religious leaders of different stripes would exist regarding, oh, whether Jesus was indeed the savior of mankind, rose from the dead and now sits at the right hand of god, whether Mohammed was indeed the final messenger of god, whether Jesus actually walked upon the continent of North America, whether there’s a special covenant between the Jewish people and god, whether…., etc., etc., Hundreds, if not thousands of years, after the fact, it’s still a matter of, at bottom, one religion saying, “Is so!” and another saying “Is not!”

    Prof. Ruse: “Here in America we are faced with many people who want to introduce evangelical Christianity into the science classes of state-supported schools. And I think that is wrong and that the way to fight it is by keeping religion out of schools period, and an important part of the strategy is by showing that teaching science does not refute or impinge on people’s faith, understood in a traditional way.” Sounds like mollifying to me. And politically, that’s fine with me. Whatever works on wannabe theocrats. But we’re not talking here about science’s manners, but science’s truth, which isn’t perfect or complete but it at least has standards and agree-upon methods by which to attempt to adjudicate differences.

    “Moral commitment” may be common to religious believers and scientists, just like not wanting to go into debt or having a satisfying love life or rooting for the Boston Red Sox may be common to both. But that doesn’t make it common ground for religion and *science* (not “scientists”).

    BTW, dank48′s comment below effectively summarizes what is unfair about most criticism of the New (Uppity) Atheists, even that of the faux-reasonable and faux-benign complementarians.

  • mavprof

    On “metaphysical naturalism,” perhaps I should have offered goxewu a thumbnail definition of a position he himself seems to hold and one commonly used in philosophical discussions–a philosophical belief system that there is nothing but natural things, forces, and causes of the kind studied in the natural sciences (see the long entry on it in Wiki), for then he might have hesitated a bit before mocking it as an “oxymoron.” Dawkins exemplifies this philosophical position: “The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference” (“River Out of Eden” [1995] 132-133). In addition, abstract objects like “mind,” consciousness,” “soul,” and “free will” can likewise be reduced to unconsciously adaptive and localized brain mechanisms. If this example of higher-order thinking that at once reduces itself to unconscious unintentional neural activity doesn’t seem self-contradictory, you are encouraged to try to discover that part of the brain that can be labelled “Magic Thinking” (perhaps it’s close to Sam Harris’s neuro-theological “God Spot”).

    There are obviously not “no standards” nor ” agreed-upon methods” brought to bear on various religious beliefs, as I said. Religious leaders of different faiths often share common beliefs pertaining to God, man, and nature, though they differ in many other aspects of belief. Believers and religious leaders often discuss these matters, and especially at interfaith conferences.

    Sure, Mr Ruse distinguishes between methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism, and in making this distinction, he can more easily than creationists, intelligent design proponents, and New Atheists alike offer its advantages in science education, but I doubt that’s the reason he’s adopted it years ago. To suggest it’s primarily a tactic is also to suggest duplicity on his part.

    Polanyi’s analysis in comparing scientific and religious thinking surely goes far beyond the simple comparison in incidentals, but it’s easy to see how one unfamiliar with his argument in “Personal Knowledge” could assert that.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_7MHPIFOJRACNS3RBRTZOKTBUMU DavidT

    “Religious leaders of different faiths often share common beliefs pertaining to God, man, and nature, though they differ in many other aspects of belief. Believers and religious leaders often discuss these matters, and especially at interfaith conferences.”

    My understanding is the various cultures that comprise the rich spectrum of human life on this planet hold extraordinarily diverse religious conceptions, from the spirit familiars of Eskimo hunters to the mountain deities of the Andean peoples, snake gods in Amazonia, and so on. It is also my understanding that few of these are represented at interfaith conferences.

    And who is to say that the animism of a small band of hunters-gatherers in the Kalahari is not the Real Truth of supernatural religious belief? Is this is a variation on the story Bertrand Russell told in his autobiography – I’m remembering back 40 years – when, in response to a Biblical literalist, he rolled his eyes back for a second and then announced his New Revelation, that the whole universe had just been created a few seconds ago, with buildings, books, animals and plants, and humans – and their false memories – all ready made? They were all being tested by God, Russell said: believe me and you will be saved. Who could prove that he was wrong, Russell asked?

  • mavprof

    The diversity of religious or spiritual beliefs presents several interesting philosophical questions, but is not ipso facto disproof of a divine or supernatural reality, for this diversity just as easily may be seen as a confirmation of free will to an exclusivist believer.

    Some philosophers agree that if both the exclusivist believer and the nonbeliever are on the same serious epistemic footing the believer and nonbeliever are obligated at least to test the evidence for and against each other’s positions. Others like the epistemologist Alvin Plantinga doubt whether equal epistemic footing is possible for the Christian exclusivist who may believe him or herself touched by grace or witness to a revelation or who believes the Holy Spirit protects his or her faith from serious doctrinal error. Other views of course are proposed, but these seem the most strikingly divergent. Nevertheless, both views seem to cast some doubt on the efficacy of the Russell experiment.

  • http://pulse.yahoo.com/_7MHPIFOJRACNS3RBRTZOKTBUMU DavidT

    “The diversity of religious or spiritual beliefs presents several interesting philosophical questions, but is not ipso facto disproof of a divine or supernatural reality, for this diversity just as easily may be seen as a confirmation of free will to an exclusivist believer.”

    I did not mention this as a form of disproof, simply to suggest that any implication that religions are essentially similar – your “Religious leaders of different faiths often share common beliefs pertaining to God, man, and nature…” – may not take into account the extraordinary variety of religious beliefs around the world.

    “Some philosophers agree that if both the exclusivist believer and the nonbeliever are on the same serious epistemic footing the believer and nonbeliever are obligated at least to test the evidence for and against each other’s positions.”

    And I take Goxewu’s point to be that it is at least difficult to conceive of tests of such “evidence”, when the positions are about supernatural phenomena. How many virgins does your religion promise you in heaven? Counting should be easy; all we have to do is get cell phone service in heaven. Did Jesus really bring dead people back to life? A tougher call – since they’re probably dead again, perhaps we could ask them in heaven, when they’re taking a break from all those virgins.

    “Others like the epistemologist Alvin Plantinga doubt whether equal epistemic footing is possible for the Christian exclusivist who may believe him or herself touched by grace or witness to a revelation or who believes the Holy Spirit protects his or her faith from serious doctrinal error. Other views of course are proposed, but these seem the most strikingly divergent. Nevertheless, both views seem to cast some doubt on the efficacy of the Russell experiment.”

    Sorry – I’m not a philosopher, just a dull scientist, so the suggestion that both views cast some doubt on the efficacy of “the Russell experiment” is opaque to me, unless by “efficacy” you mean that Russell didn’t change anyone’s mind. I’m happy to concede that he probably didn’t. But that doesn’t make his point about the impossibility of testing such claims any less valid. As The Life of Brian suggested, these problems of belief are sociological.

  • goxewu

    “Religious leaders of different faiths often share common beliefs pertaining to God, man, and nature, though they differ in many other aspects of belief. Believers and religious leaders often discuss these matters, and especially at interfaith conferences.”

    Good lord! (pun intended). This is said with a straight face?

    “..often share common beliefs pertaining to God, man, and nature…” Half the time, they can’t even agree on a *name* for god, let alone (the giveaway is the use of the term “man” for all of humanity) whether women, unclean when they mensturate, ought to be allowed to do anything more than sing in the choir.

    The weasel word in the quote is “often” and the unspoken weasel-word is “many”. [Many] religious leaders [out of how many, what type?] often [every day, as a matter of course?] discuss [behind closed doors, in public, when preaching to their own flocks?], and especially at interfaith conferences [well sure, those fluffy, bloviating, hugfests--most popular among the more diluted, deferential and polite denominations of Christianity and Judaism, with the occasional exotic Buddhist thrown in for the appearance of Eastern inclusion].

    And what do they discuss? Whether the only way of avoiding eternal damnation is accepting Jesus as one’s personal savoir, or whether everybody, regardless of faith, ought to stop at stop signs and obey the speed limit? How best to carry out jihad or whether, for members of all faiths, junk food is fattening? Whether an immigrating reform Jew is more a “real” Jew in Israel or the U.S.? Or whether kosher products are more healthful for everyone, regardless of faith?

    And the effect of these variegated clerics padding around hotel lobbies congratulating each other on how nice it is that they can actually get together and talk, on the rank-and-file worshippers in the various faiths is exactly what? Kids, can you spell n-i-l?

    Of course, I over-generalize. The effect is obviously not literally “nil.” I’m sure that the Anglican bishop of Muncie, upon returning from the “Honoring the Creative Impulse: Blending Originality with Tradition in the Major Faiths” conference in Cambridge (I’d say St. Croix, but I don’t want to be cynical), tweaked the service just a bit and allowed children’s paintings from Sunday School to be displayed in the reception hall of the rectory, temporarily.

  • goxewu

    To be fair:

    https://sites.google.com/site/interfaithdialoguebasics/interfaith-dialogue/international-interfaith-conferences-since-1893-3

    But, seriously, are the real deals much less piously stretched thin than the hypothetical “Honoring the Creative Impulse: Blending Originality with Tradition in the Major Faiths”?

  • mavprof

    David T: I’ve been more interested here in discussing the philosophical issues raised by religious belief and the distinction Mr Ruse initially proposed between methodological and metaphysical naturalism in connection with some New Atheist claims of the “science disproves religion” variety than in the types of claims theists make to justify their faiths or how these might be testable claims.

    Although I’m not a scientist, I’m also interested in how some scientists have drawn on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and quantum indeterminacy in relation to unpredictable DNA mutations. I realize “indeterminacy” and “randomness” are quite different qualities, for the former incorporates statistical probabilities. But it seems developments in quantum physics might suggest a challenge to the metaphysical naturalism of Dawkins et al about the inevitability and predictability of evolutionary change and its effects. While I can’t see (from my limited perspective) how quantum physics could ever provide proof of a Supernatural Being, I can see where it might at least allow for that possibility.

    goxewu: Back to doing what you do best–jesting; but read the caricatures once, like the Sunday comics, and they’re soon destined to pad the recycle bin. Still, keep ‘em coming. . . .

  • goxewu

    * There’s method in my mirth. I jest only to try to keep the thread from becoming as numbingly boring as an interfaith conference. But, for those (perhaps a crowd of one) who need it spelled out:

    Monotheists religions are by their nature absolutist, e.g., Jesus is either the divine savior or he’s not. While scientists of different persuasions can get together at a conference and hash out their basic differences according to some agreed-upon rules of evidence (math, prediction, falsifiability, lab experiments, peer review of the data, etc.,), leaders of monotheistic religions cannot. While individual scientists may not be convinced to change their minds on, say, the human causes of climate change or a genetic cause of different sexual orientation, a tentative consensus can be arrived at, and a conference conclusion published (sort of like a SCOTUS decision with a published dissent, or not). But agreements and changed minds at interfaith conferences are limited to inconsequential issues or cloudily all-things-to-all-people ones or, even at intra-faith conferences, doctrinal minutae.

    * As for caricatures (1), just click on the link I provided (which is an ecumenically theist link, not some “New Atheist” exposé), and compare my parody conference title with the recent ones on the link. Caricature, really? Aside: The religion column in the daily newspaper is more likely to “pad the recycle bin” than the comics pages.

    * As for caricatures (2), the paragraph I quoted from mavprof looked to me at first glance like a premise for a Monty Python skit.

    I’m starting to think that mavprof’s willful obliviousness is due to his being possessed by demons. In the spirit (pardon the pun) of Bertrand Russell, prove me wrong.

  • mavprof

    The mirth in goxewu’s postings I often like, though his method’s often wanting in good sense. That’s often the sacrifice one has to make when hyperbole and caricature get the better of measured argument. Trivial bits like the “giveaway” use of “man” (the species, not the sex) are about equivalent to me making sport of goxewu’s typo “personal ‘savoir’” (personal “knowledge”).

    On the demonic possession bit, I seem to hear a not-so-distant echo of a goxewu mumbling something against “[t]he old saw about not being able to prove a negative. You can’t prove *there is no god,* just like you can’t prove there are no unicorns or interstellar aliens walking on Earth.” Seems a case of goxewu contra goxewu, though perhaps just the words of some other goxewu from some other star system, and, as is well known, “autres planetes, autres moeurs.”

  • goxewu

    “Man, the species.” Got it. Sorry “humanity” was already taken. (Note: mavprof wasn’t quoting somebody from back in the day when humanity or humankind was usually referred to as “man” or “mankind.” Word choice says something. And, oh, “God” is a He.)

    No, one can’t prove a negative of the sort that says unicorns or tooth fairies don’t exist. Even the scientific proof that phlogiston doesn’t exist is open to falsifiability when some of the fiery stuff actually shows up some day. But falsifiability on the basis of evidence is one of the differences between science and religion. In religion, one can make any ol’ claim regarding the supernatural (Jesus sits at the right hand of god, “God spoke directly to me last night as I was making dinner,” an actual Satan is the one who tempts us to do bad things, demons exist and can be exorcised, “I am the new anointed savior of [ahem!] mankind,” etc.) with absolutely no fear of being proven wrong by anything that could reasonably be considered evidence.

    Nor can some newly minted religious assertion that seems totally wacko be refuted by the fact that only one person, or just a couple of nut cases, believe it. a) Most religions started that way* and b) the resemblance of any given religion to a giant, longstanding, prosperous multinational corporation with sumptuous and ornate world headquarters and fancy branches and uniformed employees all over the place is irrelevant to its basic supernatural assertions. (Ask a Shaker.)

    Aside: “Other worlds, other beliefs” (and/or “other places, other customs,” “other countries, other ways”) are common expressions. There’s no need, except pretentiousness, to say it in French on a blog comment. Unless it’s a citation of the original by somebody famous (sigh).

    * The cultural anthropology of religion is fascinating. The fact that religious beliefs spring up, continue, die out, thrive, spread, morph like any other human phenomenon (clothing, cuisine, language, art, music, etc.) leads one to suspect that religion is basically a grass-roots deal, and not a top-down one. That is, we humans make it up.

  • mavprof

    It’s true I prefer traditional terms like “man” for humanity and “quotation” rather than the informal “quote” you prefer as well as quotations of or obvious references to well-known adages sometimes in their originals, but I shouldn’t read to much into it, as you seem prone to do. I tend to ignore PC language scolds when I’m not laying it on just to tweak them a bit.

    I see you’ve abandoned your “bottom line” tactic of requiring proof of a negative (this time, proof against demonic possession) you once argued against. Consistency restored.

    Acceptance of the falsifiability principle in scientific investigations is not inconsistent with holding religious beliefs, and, as I’ve suggested above in the examples of the uncertainty principle and quantum indeterminacy, science seems to have an inherently limited role in what it can teach us about truth and reality. In no way does this role justify a trumpeting anti-theistic materialism. But my concern on this thread has been more with philosophical treatments of belief. In light of your idem in alio comments on religion and falsifiability (which is not synonymous with the false) and your penchant for concrete description, you might be interested in the Flew-Hare-Mitchell-Hick exchanges based on parables.

  • goxewu

    OK, it ain’t male hideboundism, it’s just tweaking the PCers. Right.

    I haven’t abandoned anything. No, you can’t prove a negative. But in science you can come close, through an examination of the evidence. The conclusion is always tentative, though, because new evidence might show up. With religion, however, there’s no evidence to examine. (Anybody have a video or GPS of Jesus sitting at the right hand of God? Anybody have a phone tap of god speaking directly to me while I was making dinner? Anybody witness–in the police sense of the word–Satan tempting anybody? Anybody see those demons at work inside mavprof?) No, it’s all “faith.” That’s why major religious doctrine is unfalsifiable (yes, I know falsifiable doesn’t mean “false”). It’s absolutely certain, based on “faith,” that, say, Jesus sits at the right hand of God. No new evidence is going to show up to convince the faithful that some new, improved, proven (in the laboratory or on the blackboard or in the computer or applied in an experiment) religious belief should supplant what they already believe.

    Science may have a limited role in what it can teach us about truth and reality, but that limit doesn’t bid one leap into religion. (As many have said before, the proponents of religion are almost never of the “Gee, there are some things that science can’t quite prove, so we ought to leave a little room for a noncommital maybe about there being something *else.*” They’re usually believers in some specific creation myth and attendant do’s and don’t's that sound fairly fairy-tale to rationalists. Which is why proponents of religion in the abstract don’t want to reveal their specific creeds on thread such as these. They use the “If a brilliant, scientific fellow such as Polanyi can believe, why can’t we all?” when it suits them, but assiduously avoid the “If somebody actually believes that Jesus rose from the dead to sit at the right hand of God, what kind of intellectual credibility can he really have?”

    In the end, I’ll take my chances with science and the uncertainty principle over religion and the based-on-nothing-but-faith certainty principle.

  • mavprof

    On the question of proving a negative I merely pointed out an apparent inconsistency in goxewu’s arguments (he now seems to prefer third person addresses and may sometime soon adopt a further application of them, such as “goxewu’s neural activity shows,” as a more “scientific” reference to his own thinking, so I’ll try to accommodate this possible future change), not categorically ruled out disproofs of negatives, for of course they’re necessary to logical thinking, e.g., in applying the principle of non-contradiction (guess Aristotle was right about that after all), double negative propositions, and probable inductive arguments, given the soundness of the premises. But as Kierkegaard noted, there is a system of logic, but there is no system of human existence.

    Some orthodox faiths have traditionally respected a combination of faith and reason (fides et ratio) to approach questions of existence. And after all, one can easily apply the term “belief” or “faith” to trust in one’s senses, reason, and memory as well as to trust in revelation, tradition, authority, and inspiration. In contrast, goxewu’s neurons seem to allow “him” rather repetitively to caricature religious faith as necessarily “blind,” anti-rational (rather than in part non-rational), and impossible for any credible scientist to accept, but this isn’t the case, despite goxewu’s neural activity’s preemptory dismissals of all thinking on religion (however subtle) by scientists and philosophers who are also believers as self-delusional nonsense (when “he” was give names of some).

  • goxewu

    * I (notice: first person, as usual) simply avoid the second person. That is, I don’t address my disputant directly. Why? Because “Brainstorm” threads are public forums and–hello?–there are other people out there beside mavprof and myself. I address them *about* mavprof, or whomever, and the issue(s) at hand. Third-person references to myself are not in the cards.

    * “And after all, one can easily apply the term ‘belief’ or ‘faith’ to trust in one’s senses, reason, and memory as well as to trust in revelation, tradition, authority, and inspiration.” “Faith” in one’s senses, reason, memory is hardly the same as “faith” in revelation, tradition, authority and (religious) inspiration. If my “faith” in my vision’s telling me that the sliding glass door is open is contradicted by my running into a closed sliding glass door and getting my paper plate of patio dinner all over my shirt, I make an adjustment in that “faith,” telling myself not to trust it under certain circumstance, making sure I tap the space with my finger first to make sure the door is open, asking someone if the door is open, etc. Similarly with memory, if I’m wrong on a particular, or have a serious doubt, I can check it in various ways–asking other people, going to Google, looking in my files, etc. In other words, such “faith” is tested somewhat scientifically (i.e., common-sensically), and revised according to the results. Religious faith is of a different character. How many Christians quit being Christians because a prayer didn’t get results? (I suppose I have to look forward to a convenient fuzzying up of what prayer is–not a request, but a general “conversation with God,” a meditation with moving lips, etc.)

    * Many scientists do accept, and practice, religious faith. But when they do, they’re sort of off-duty as scientists. Pascal’s Wager and all that. What mavprof has yet to furnish this discussion with is a synopsized example of a scientist’s particularly sophisticated and subtle thinking–something that a non-scientist couldn’t do–that leads him or her to the existence of god and–probably too much to hope for–that leads him or her to a particular faith. What we’ve been given so far are the equivalent of book-jacket blurbs for religion: “I’m certainly convinced that God exists” — Prof. Harley Butterfield, Ph.D., renowned professor of physics at The Famous Scientific Insitute.

    “…rather than in part non-rational.” Interesting. What part? How big a part? Where does the difference show up? What separates the rational from the non-rational, or are they all sort of mooshed around together? What prevents the non-rational part, which is subject to no limits of reason, from taking over the entirety of religious faith? Can any edifice of thought that’s rational be securely built on a foundation of the non-rational? Why and how is one brand of partly non-rational religious faith determined (by, say, a prospective believer) to be better than another, e.g., Episcopaleanism or Scientology, Islam or Catholicism, wiccan or Buddhism, Mormonism or zoroastrianism, animism or Hinduism?

  • mavprof

    The remarks on speaking persons and how reductive materialists like goxewu might more consistently refer to themselves was just a tweak for goxewu’s “is mavprof possessed by demons?” bit. Of course they’re public fora.

    The question intially posed on this thread was Mr Ruse’s argument that the belief in or practice of evolutionary science doesn’t ipso facto exclude religious belief or practice as some New Atheists have unwarrantedly claimed. I’ve argued more or less the same here, not that science provides proofs for the existence of God. Some scientists who are believers may find *confirmation* of their religious beliefs in their studies of the natural world, but I doubt whether most would offer these as proofs.

    I’ve offered a few examples of how several scientists have challenged the “science disproves religion” claim of the Dawkins-Dennett variety by referring to quantum indeterminacy (see above). To lay out extensive and subtly argued points usually requires essay or book-length space, but now that I’ve read it. I’d recommend Kenneth R Miller’s “Finding Darwin’s God” as a readable challenge to metaphysical naturalism by a biologist who is a believer (goxewu can ignore the book-jacket praises of the book by the former president of the National Academy of Sciences and a Templeton Prize winning biologist). I’ve also recently sampled some of the essays in the 800-page “Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives.” I think one would find the arguments pursued there anything but the book-jacket blurb caricatures goxewu keeps invoking.

  • goxewu

    * “…the belief in or practice of evolutionary science doesn’t ipso facto exclude religious belief or practice as some New Atheists have unwarrantedly claimed.”

    1. Obviously TBIOPOES doesn’t “ipso facto exclude religious belief” because examples abound of believing and practicing evolutionary scientists adhering to religious beliefs. That’s not the question. The questions are: Are those scientists being consistent with their science when they do adhere to any but the vaguest, “Well, maybe there could be something else out there,” religious beliefs? And how, exactly, do they reconcile the two? 2. There are athetists and then there are New Atheists and then there are “some New Atheists,” each segment getting, in turn, a little more dogmatic (“dogma,” hmmm; in what area of human endeavor is that word most used?). I can’t defend the manners of all atheists. But their transgressions pale in comparison to the bad rhetorical behavior of “some religionists,” maybe even most of them if you recognize the bottom-line condemnation of those, even other religionists, who believe otherwise.

    * “To lay out extensive and subtly argued points usually requires essay or book-length space…”

    A blog thread is a kind of conversation–perhaps not of the dinner-table variety, but it’s certainly not a seminar with reading assignments. “If you want to know what I’m talking about, go read this book,” doesn’t really cut it in a thread. (It doesn’t cut it when atheists do it, either.) If mavprof has read, digested, and internalized all this subtle and sophisticated thinking reconciling (evolutionary) science with a belief in a “God,” then perhaps he might provide a plain-English (i.e., more polysyllabic than a newspaper sports column but more intelligible than, say, Judith Butler) summary of some of it.

    * “…the book-jacket praises of the book by the former president of the National Academy of Sciences and a Templeton Prize winning biologist”

    Here we go again: more empty argument-by-authority. Even with that, while former NSA president impresses somewhat, “Templeton Prize-winning” doesn’t. A book reconciling Darwin with religious belief is praised by a scientist who won a prize from a foundation that gives a prize for reconciling science with religious belief. Quel surprise. Shorthand: We really ought to leave the Templeton Prize out of it. And a footnote: If mavprof has an objection to “the book-jacket blurb caricatures goxewu keeps invoking,” it might be more convincing if he didn’t invoke book-jacket blurbs in rebuttal. (Unless, of course, the blurb he cites is actually occupies that essay or book-length space” mavprof says is required to “lay out extensive and subtly argued points.” Some jacket!)

  • mavprof

    Obviously goxewu didn’t catch the gist of the second paragraph and first sentence of the third of my penultimate posting before reformulating the central question Mr Ruse posed in essentially the same way, aside from his chuntering on about unrelated issues like the obvious fact there are scientist believers and the respective manners of some atheists and believers in debate.

    As I said above, there are suggestions on this thread and the previous ones about challenges Mr Miller and others (including atheist scientists and philosophers) have made to metaphysical naturalism and reductive materialism. In the course of the exchanges on this thread goxewu has learned that the term “metaphysical naturalism” is not a funny oxymoron, that one can prove a negative, and that “dogma” has both neutral and pejorative senses, among other amazing things.

    If goxewu won’t consult a book (as they say, I guess he’s already got a book), he might judge from reading reviews of Miller’s book here,
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finding_Darwin's_God,
    which links to an assortment of reviews (theistic evolutionist, agnostic–Mr Ruse, skeptic, ID creationist, and young earth creationist), and then choose his favorite.

    goxewu contra goxewu again on the use of foreign expressions–quelle surprise merveilleuse! (note proper agreement of adjectives and noun)

  • goxewu

    The use of the incorrect “quel surprise” was supposed to register as ironically pretentious. Sorry if it was off mavprof’s visible spectrum.

    “He’s already got a book.” Cute. Lots of believers I know say they need only one book, too.

    A link is fine. I’ll take a look, although I’d rather have had mavprof actually argue a position (as most of the a-religious comments on this and related “Brainstorm” threads do) instead of continually merely alluding to one that’s held by real smart people that mavprof knows about. Maybe some of them are, as they say in Las Vegas, “very close personal friends” of his.

    A close personal friend of mine who’s a “Brainstorm” fan, says that there seem to be two topics that are practically flogged to death on its threads: “God” or not, and discrimination suffered by conservatives in academe. He’s a little bored with both, he says. So, in spite of all the issue-ettes that mavprof has left twitching on the table (e.g., the difference between “faith” in one’s senses and religious faith, the obvious lack of restraints on the superantural or magic once you let it in the door as an explanation of things, the absence of standards of evidence and proof to decide major religious issues, e.g., the alleged divinity and magical powers of certain long-ago individuals, etc.), it’s time for me–as walsh05, suomynona, dank48 and DavidT have wisely done–to leave this thread to others. I’ve only been providing, I realize, a goad for mavprof to keep wrapping superstition in faculty-tea language.

    As an adie…oops! sign-off–my considered estimate is that 17,453 angels, plus or minus mavprof’s left foot, can dance on the head of a pin.

  • mavprof

    Bloggers’ comments notwithstanding, I’ll stick by Mr Ruse’s wiser approach to the separation of scientific systems (properly, methodological naturalism), and especially evolutionary science, from religious systems of belief. Over the course of several postings and the ensuing commentaries on this topic, I’ve expressed skepticism about the philosophical assertions of metaphysical naturalists and their explicit reductions of human consciousness, mind, language, and all aspects of culture to unconscious epiphenomena or simple material effects of inevitable evolutionary development as well as their implicit denial of human free will and agency. I’ve also supported this skeptical view with references and commentaries from atheist scientists or philosophers like Tallis, agnostics like Ruse, and believers like Miller in rejecting the unwarranted and self-contradictory claims (such as employing high-order reasoning to deny the possibility of reason) of New Atheists like Dawkins and Dennett. When rightly seen as a debate, not over scientific (methodological naturalism), but over competing philosophical stances on metaphysical naturalism and its plausibility, I think there is ample room for skepticism.

    Unfortunately, several such as goxewu have time and again attempted to frame the debate as one over the truth or falsity of religion rather than one of competing philosophical views about metaphysical naturalism as a complete and sufficient explanation of all human thought and endeavors. For several unbelievers on these threads the itch to play the village atheist and engage in meretricious mockery of complex systems of religious thought have led to a farrago of assertions, including the repeated and unsupported charges by goxewu than scientist believers can have none but vague or hopelessly sentimental grounds for their beliefs. But again, God’s existence is not the question as originally presented, but whether science and religion may properly coexist relatively independently.

    To illustrate these competing philosophical views (not proofs), the first excerpt below represents the views of biologist, science historian, and metaphysical naturalist William Provine (Cornell):

    “Modern science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or ethical laws, no absolute guiding principles for human society. . . . Finally, free will as it is traditionally conceived–the freedom to make uncoerced [sic] and unpredictable choices among alternative courses of action–simply does not exist. . . . There is no way that the evolutionary process as currently conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make moral choices.” (quoted in Kenneth R Miller, “Finding Darwin’s God” 171-72)

    The second is by the biologist, methodological naturalist, and religious believer Miller (Brown U) himself:

    “The strength of science, we are told, is the impartial objectivity it applies to nature, even to human nature. Questions about good and evil, about the meaning and purpose of existence, the sorts of things that have busied philosophers since ancient times, have no place in science, because they cannot be addressed by the scientific method. . . . The concept of purpose, my colleagues would be quick to remind me, stands outside of science. But if it does, then so does its exact opposite, that the human species has no purpose . . .” (Miller 269-70)

    A bientot,

  • goxewu

    I know I said I was going, but…l’esprit de l’escalier (did I get that right?) plus, finally (finally!) the nut of the argument right out there in plain daylight:

    “…the freedom to make uncoerced [sic] and unpredictable choices among alternative courses of action–simply does not exist. . . . There is no way that the evolutionary process as currently conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make moral choices.”

    The *need* to think of ourselves as free to make moral choices, and, as per Prof. Miller, as having some kind of greater purpose to their existence, precedes and determines the thinking that discovers that freedom and that purpose. Since it’s painful and well nigh intolerable to think of ourselves as without “free will as it is traditionally conceived” and without a “purpose” to our existence, there *must* be such a free will** and such a (presumably benevolent) purpose. We see instances of this kind of thinking all the time in the news, e.g., the mother for whom it is intolerable to think of her son as guilty of a vicious crime, therefore he *must,* on faith, be innocent. Or certain groups of people for whom life is almost intolerable unless they can believe themselves to some kind of god-granted purpose that makes them inherently superior to other people. When the son is convicted, or the groups are confounded by evidence that they’re not inherently superior, the pain to the mother and to the groups is great.

    Believers who are thinkers enough not to be fundamentalists ask, “What kind of world am I [are we] condemned to live in when there’s no external guidance toward morality and no greater purpose to our existence that to live and die biologically?” I don’t know. And I do part company with some atheists who think that finally getting out from under religious belief per se (as opposed to getting out from under the in-the-world clout of organized religion) will make us happier, or at least less tormented. Science (as opposed to technology) and philosophy (as opposed to political or social philosophy) are after some kind of let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may truth, not ways to make the human species feel better about itself. If human self-esteem and feeling better are by-products, fine, but if not, well, promises, rose gardens, never, etc.

    I know it’s a bitter pill to swallow. It is for me; I’m not happy having come to the working conclusion that there really isn’t any externally mandated purpose to human existence. But I have to, as the kids say, “deal with it.”

    Toot a lure.

  • mavprof

    goxewu’s “esprit de l’escalier” or stairway wit seems not to have rescued him from Diderot’s confession in “Paradoxe sur le Comedien” (the source of the term) that in discussions often “[il] perd la tete” (lit. “loses his head” or becomes confused).

    And in his confusion he misconstrues Miller’s point that if science cannot and should not provide an ultimate answer to the purpose of human existence then it cannot disprove such a purpose as well. In this, he seems to agree with unbelieving agnostics like Mr Ruse and atheists like Tallis and to counter the philosophical-wrapped-as-scientific claim of Provine that free will is a delusion that obviates all moral and ethical choices. Against Miller, goxewu relies on the dubious claim that Miller–and Ruse and Tallis possibly–allow for the possibility of religious belief and free will simply as self-delusional bromides, as I’ve said before, a presumptuous, condescending, and pedestrian-psychologizing assertion. And again, if Mr Ruse and Tallis are not sentimentalizing believers as he presumes Miller to be, how might goxewu account for their possible self-delusions about free will?

    Further, in these threads on the New Atheism goxewu has previously quoted and commented on my association of traditional religious belief with the idea of free will as follows:

    “Credit where due, and many thanks to those responsible. But that doesn’t mean that free will is supposed to stop, presumably out of everlasting gratitude, at the observation that there isn’t much proof–in both the scientific and common-sense sense of the word–that god exists . . .”

    Then, on this thread we have this:

    “The *need* to think of ourselves free to make moral choices, and as per Prof. Miller, as having some kind of greater purpose to their [sic] existence, precedes and determines the thinking that discovers that freedom and that purpose. Since it’s painful and well nigh intolerable to think of ourselves as without “free will as it is traditionally conceived” and without a ‘purpose’ to our existence, there *must* be such a free will** [sic] and such a (presumably benevolent) purpose.”

    Here again we seem to have a case of goxewu contra goxewu or the “two goxewus conundrum,” one who credits the traditional idea of free will and the other who reduces it to a mere self-comforting delusion. Which goxewu seems to have “perd la tete”? Will there be a third to try to “save the appearances”?

    And conversely, can’t assenting to the idea of free will and making ourselves responsible for our choices be a burden too heavy to bear for some? “Well, actually, my evolution-produced unconscious neural activity did it, your honor . . .” seems to accord with Nietzsche’s observation that “[w]e are so wretched! . . . Someone must be to blame! Otherwise, it would be intolerable!”

  • goxewu

    I’ve had several students over the course of my teaching career who argued, begged, pleaded, demanded, stomped, fumed and even issued mild threats (“My Dad is a very influential member of the Alumni Association, you know”) concening an undesirable grade they got in a course of mine.

    All of it boiled down to their *need* for a better grade. Without the better grade, they wouldn’t be able to graduate, they’d have to leave school, they’d lose scholarships, their prospective careers as lawyers or doctors or captains of industry would go up in smoke. Their needs–which weren’t frivolous; most of the students genuinely wanted the better grade in order to continue apace in school and, eventually, to become productive, eve praiseworthy citizens.

    But their need for the better grade was so great that it translated, for them, into a truth: “I really, really, really need a B; so the quality of my work in this course *must* have been a B; yes, it really was B-level work; otherwise my little world–scholarship, graduation, medical school, becoming a doctor, doing society some good–will go all to hell.”

    And, I had to admit in some cases, I was possibly, even probably, throwing a spanner in the works of the life of a generally upstanding student who might do the world some good in the long run.

    But–and here’s the point–the student’s *need* for a B did not equal the *truth* about the quality of his/her work in the course.

    Similarly–and here’s the other point–society’s overwhelming *need* to believe in some kind of god, some kind of externally mandated and presumably benevolent purpose to human existence, some kind of extra-evolutionary “free will” that leads inexorably to some kind of “individual responsibility” that, in turn, makes possible, among other things, an orderly system of justice that keeps people enough on the straight and narrow so that anarchy doesn’t reign, does *not,* I’m afraid equal the *truth* about whether a god who can provide all those things really exists.

    In short: Our really, really, really needing something to be so does not equal it’s being so.

    Note: I’m not a “New Atheist” in the sense that I’m absolutely 100 percent certain that something outside materialistic universe (“materialistic” including the various forms of energy, etc.) doesn’t exist. Convincing evidence could arrive tomorrow. But, philosophically, I rather regard religion to be the prosecution with a case (the existence of a god with palpable properties) to prove, and atheism as the defense, the acceptable default position until the prosecution proves its case. Socially, I realize, it’s the reverse: Religion, especially in this country among nations of the West, is the allegedly benign default position (e.g., almost all elected officials, when asked, have to attest to a religious belief), and atheism is the brash prosecution disturbing the social order.

    Note: The problem of “free will” in a materialist universe is no less of a philosophical conundrum than the problem of “free will” under an *omnipotent* god.

    Beyond toe.

  • goxewu

    Corrections:

    “Their needs weren’t frivolous; most of the students…”

    “I’m not a ‘New Atheist’ because I’m not absolutely 100 percent certain…”

    “The problem of ‘free will’ under an *omnipotent* god is no less of a philosophical conundrum than the problem of ‘free will’ in a materialist universe.”

  • mavprof

    Thanks to goxewu for his response. His anecdotes about his students pleading the need for a better grade I’ve no reason to doubt, though it’s conceivable several may in truth have had private reservations about their course performances being worth that better grade for which they pled. As goxewu describes some of their reactions to a less-than-hoped-for mark and beside-the-point pleading tactics, it’s quite possible some indeed may have realized their own relatively poor performances.

    Nevertheless, a scientist-believer in free will like Professor Miller may not be an apt choice to illustrate goxewu’s apparent need to apply the “need to believe” motivation to scientist-believers like Miller (as I’ve argued above, an assertion that is presumptuous, condescending, and preemptory in addition to quite lacking in proof–rather unscientific and even sub-philosophical that) by comparing him with the cases of goxewu’s pleading students. Nor does such a proffered motivation explain the views of a scientist-atheist like Professor Tallis who defends free will against reductive mechanist accounts in a number of sophisticated philosophical works that nevertheless draw from his scientific expertise. Neither argues that, in general, science or the application of scientific method proves or disproves religion or free will as New Atheists like Professors Dawkins and Dennett argue in making what amount to philosophical rather than scientific claims. goxewu seems to acknowledge this in making his own case against religious belief “philosophically,” as he says.

    And while religious belief seems the “default position” for US politicians as says goxewu, it surely is not for scientists and academics in their respective milieux, where belief in disbelief is more than quite acceptable and even promoted.

  • tiablau

    Since all classes are online, students will not have to attend classes.”High Speed Universities”

  • http://saurilio.blogspot.com Suzanne Aurilio

    What kind of credit do they receive? If the program is  through continuing ed are the credits transferable or applicable to an undergraduate degree? I like the innovation of the model. I’ve used RS on my own, and have taught English as a Foreign Language. It’s pedagogically sound software. 
    My concern arises around the issue of qualifications. If it’s true that everyone is rushing out to go back to school, upgrade their skills, get more credentials, etc., then the quality of the credentials one receives will become increasingly more important on the job market. Continuing ed credits are great, but I’m not sure they’ll have the clout, one might expect or want on the job market.