What if nobody volunteers? And can I get extra-credit if I go first?

How many billions of dollars are spent on governmental committees for education?  Hypothesis:  As  the number of committees,  expenses and evaluation techniques increases, the quality of education decreases.

I must disagree with lizziec, as I found evidences of ideology, rhetoric and agenda throughout the article.  A few examples: 
 “The for-profit sector, which has the potential to make important contributions to educational opportunity in the United States, relies on the federal government for most of its revenues.” Why do the authors leave out the fact that that non-profit public institutions rely on state, local and federal government for most of their revenue?  Why is there no mention of the fact that numerous private companies also rely on government contracts as a major source of their revenues?
 “Institutions that leave students worse off than they were when they arrived are the exception in the public and private nonprofit sectors. Unfortunately, they appear to be the norm in the for-profit sector.”  It is difficult to come up with a more ideologically biased statement than this.  With more than 3,000 non-profit and 3,000 for-profit schools, have the authors truly done an analysis that separates exception from norm in both sectors?  The Dept. of Education has not, Tom Harkin has not.
“The character of the for-profit sector has changed as it is increasingly dominated by large, publicly held companies that are compelled by shareholders to maximize profit.”  It is true that the headlines are dominated by the same dozen or so publicly held companies.  Why do the authors not mention that the vast majority of for-profit schools are not publicly traded and have no Wall-Street shareholders?  What would keep them from including this important bit of information?  Ideology?
“Students who enroll in institutions or programs that graduate few of their students, or that succeed in placing only a small percentage in remunerative positions in the fields for which they have been trained, are playing the lottery.”  This statement is just as true for students seeking low paying/low demand disciplines offered at non-profit institutions, but the authors’ ideology is revealed quite clearly.

Institutions that violate laws (regardless of their tax status) and that engage in deceptive marketing, should be punished.  Non-profit and for-profit should both be held accountable.

The preamble is nice but then you jump to assumptions not in evidence regarding failures by the institutions when there exists no such evidence that the programs are inadequate. No one has proven statistically or even anecdotally that low repayment correlates with low quality. This testimony is rife with false assumptions and bias. The fact that you can’t even see that is a sign of how little contact you have with the actual practice of for-profit institutions. Nice try, but no.

“Why do the authors not mention that the vast majority of for-profit
schools are not publicly traded and have no Wall-Street shareholders?”

If you look at the data in terms of enrollment numbers – the majority are publicly traded and have wall street shareholders.

Do cheerleaders study the tactical maneuvers of the team they are cheering for?

Yes, very well done!  It sounds as though several of us are reaching the same conclusions.   The gainful employment rule, though, should it ever be expanded and enforced, would put our whole higher education system under the microscope.  Someone graduating from a non-profit public university with a degree in elementary education can easily owe $50 or $60,000 in federal loans, and will likely make a salary of  $35K.  It’s tough to start your career underwater.   I agree with Lizzie’s point below–at least the hypothetical student I’m describing would have been intellectually prepared for college, but the money issues are a serious problem, and they’ll only get worse.  Ohio State just announced that it will have to raise tuition by 3.3% next year.  Every increase hurts.

also note this. Why? THis is also true in other state systems, with high priced administrators all over the place. Why? Same goes for “chancellors” and the duplication of high priced administrators in K12. It’s absurd, especially given the fact that students coninue to find themselves in more debt, year over year.

As UC president, Yudof will receive a compensation package valued at
$828,000 in the 2008-09 year, compared to a current package estimated at
$790,000 at the University of Texas. (These figures do not include
standard retirement plan funding for future retirement benefits for
university employees at both institutions.)

The UC compensation consists of the following elements:

an annual base salary of $591,084 (compared to current annual cash
compensation of $528,860 at the University of Texas). The UC salary
falls below the midpoint salary ($606,200) set for this position by the
Board of Regents and below the median salary ($644,900) of leaders of
similar public and private universities used by the California
Postsecondary Education Commission for comparison purposes.

as an exception to policy, supplemental pension funding amounting to
$228,000 in 2008-09 and varying somewhat each year thereafter. This
funding, in combination with normal UC Retirement Plan benefits, is
intended to produce a UC retirement benefit comparable to what Yudof
would have expected to receive at his present employer. (The University
of Texas presently provides Yudof $250,000 per year in supplemental
deferred compensation in addition to his base salary and normal
retirement benefits.)
an automobile allowance of $743 per month or $8,916 per year;
university-provided housing, as a condition of employment;
reasonable lodging, transportation and other business-related expenses
associated with university business prior to his relocation, along with
reimbursement of actual costs for packing and relocation of household
effects and library;
consistent with past practice, if Yudof assumes a UC faculty position
immediately after his tenure as UC president, the university will
arrange for the relocation of his personal belongings, and he will be
eligible for a Mortgage Origination Program loan in order to purchase a
primary residence;
use of administrative funds for official entertainment and other purposes allowed by policy; and
standard health, pension and senior management benefits, and standard sabbatical, sick leave and vacation accrual.

Hi David, You’ll be happy to know that we still have many side conversations about the JIL postings. I work at a state university and there’s no faculty lounge to fill with the smell of freshly roasted coffee; there are no wooden tables, plush chairs, or windows with wrought iron grates. It’s California and no leaves are falling outside our window. I think all these latter aesthetic things are what you are longing for, not the JIL. Just an interpretation.

I would also ask how much and what types of abuse you can inflict upon contingent faculty, staff and students with impunity. That is an important measure of tenure and surely separates the spurious and thin forms of tenure from the robust and traditional sorts.

Nor should it be

“Ask, ask, ask. Prepare to be horrified.”

About 10 years ago I interviewed at a competing school.  I met many different people throughout the day and asked every one of them what it took to get tenure.  I got the exact same answer from all of them – new hires, newly tenured, senior faculty – until my last meeting of the day when I met with the NEW dean.  He described roughly double the research output that everyone else had told me.  When I pointed out that his answer differed greatly from all the other answers he said “it’s time to raise the bar”.  

I didn’t get the job but I felt bad for the recent hires who were brought in under one set of expectations and then had a new set thrust upon them.  At least I would have known what I was getting into.  A couple years later, the dean moved on to a bigger position and left a mess behind.

Establishing clear tenure criteria is critical.  Many institutions, especially R1s, have 2 sets of tenure requirements: those spelled out in the university and departmental policy documents, and the constantly shifting “tacit” criteria that can be used to push a qualified candidate out of the “club.” Examples: he’s got 35 papers but not enough from his “primary project,” she didn’t get any job offers from other institutions; one of his old colleagues served on the editorial board of a journal he published in, so those papers “don’t count,” she only has 2 grants as PI and should have 3.  Some universities are working hard to standardize, openly circulate and de-mystify tenure criteria so this kind of thing has a lower probability of happening, but unfortunately it’s still all too common.  Candidates should get department heads and anyone else involved in the tenure and promotion process to commit in writing to exactly what the criteria are (including quantifiable metrics like the required number of publications and grants) and be prepared for a fight if the goalposts get moved at the last minute.

I have gotten the impression that tenure decisions are quite uneven, having seen some strong researcher/teachers fail to be promoted, while some real flunkies got tenure (at list in private, liberal arts colleges). In these cases the difference seemed to have to do with whether you had backing or not, and backing often required that one be as inept and incompetent as one’s backers. Are my experiences anomalous? 

What are the differences, both structural and practical of tenure track versus non-tenure track? Have an advising practice of 17years – want to slow it down but continue it while teaching. Currently, a PhD candidate.