It’s late in the day for the Bush administration to be developing ambitious plans to enlist the social, behavioral, and political sciences for dealing with nations that are collapsing, strife-ridden, or otherwise worrisome for U.S. interests. But that’s what’s proposed in a high-level report that has gone virtually unnoticed since it was issued in February.

Though Bush and company depart next January, presidential directives to the federal bureaucracy can linger on and even thrive in subsequent administrations. The proposal invites recall of past controversies, dating back to the Vietnam war, over the involvement of social and behavioral researchers in government missions under the guise of scholarly inquiry.

Titled ”Research and Development Challenges for Regional Stability and Capacity Building,” the report bears the imprint of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), a cabinet-level body for government-wide coordination of science and technology activities. Officially chaired by the President, and including the Vice President, the NSTC is part of the White House science advisory apparatus. The report was prepared by the Regional Stability Interagency Working Group, co-chaired by representatives from the Pentagon and the State Department, and was approved by the NSTC and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

“In general,” the report states, “new or emerging tools from the social, political, and behavioral sciences have not been effectively leveraged, targeted, or developed to significantly contribute to the rebuilding of conflict-torn societies or the stabilization of pre-conflict environments…. The future success of regional stability operations will rely, in part, on conscious, deliberate, and sufficiently resourced efforts using scientific and systematic approaches that apply critical lessons learned to the development of future capabilities.”

Listing areas for research, the report calls upon “the R&D community” to provide means “for accurately characterizing and measuring underlying political, economic, and social conditions [and] dynamics.” To which it adds, “Operators need tools that will provide anticipatory assessments of when and why states might fail and prepare options for U.S./multinational intervention in failed or failing states, and to inform decisions regarding the appropriate depth, nature (economic, medical, resource, communication, technological) and level of engagement.”

Listed among nations in which the U.S. has engaged in “stability and capacity-building operations” in recent years are Iraq, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Bosnia.

In one of the few references to military activity, the report calls for developing “strategies to create early successes,” adding that “The early win strategy must be integrated with immediate military, security, and information operations but also linked to long-term development programs.”

Under the heading “Strategic Communications,” the report deems it “vital” for the U.S. “to influence public opinion domestically, globally, and within a host-nation’s population.”

To achieve these goals, the report says the government should state its needs “in as specific terms as possible so that the R&D community, especially industry and academia, can devote resources to solving real problems. Where appropriate,” it adds, “provide resources and/or guidance to overcome those obstacles that the community is unable to provide on its own.”